Optimization Methods for a Stakeholder Society pp 125-138 | Cite as

# Multifarious Comparisons for Objectives and Attributes

## Abstract

The previous chapter concluded that multifarious comparisons of alternatives are preferred above binary ones. For multifarious comparison, this chapter moves from some theoretically self-evident approaches to situations in which the alternatives seem to be incomparable. Indeed, an a priori priority between the objectives gives the impression that the problem is easily solved. This seems also the case, if some alternatives are dropped out, due to not satisfying some minimum or maximum requirements. In addition, domination of one alternative over all the others would easily solve the problem. The problem remains if a ranking turns out to be impossible with incomparably looking alternatives.

## Keywords

Multiobjective Optimization Marginal Utility Pareto Optimum Capital Requirement Soft Constraint## Preview

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## Notes Part 3 Chapter 3

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