Is Mandatory Access in the Postal Sector the Key to Success?

  • Nick van der Lijn
  • Arno Meijer
Conference paper
Part of the Topics in Regulatory Economics and Policy Series book series (TREP, volume 46)

Abstract

In recent discussions about future postal regulation in the European Union, policy makers and regulators frequently mention (downstream) access on top of further liberalization as a suitable policy to improve efficiency in postal markets. In Germany, access has, at least in theory, been granted while in the United Kingdom the first steps in this direction have been set. Proponents of access often refer to the implementation of an effective system of work sharing in the United States in the postal sector and the parallels with other sectors such as telecommunications and electricity where regulated access has been introduced more or less successfully. The fact that the nature and history of postal regulation in the United States, built around the legal delivery monopoly of USPS, is different than the European context strikes the eye less often. Moreover, the profound differences between the postal business and the production and organization structure in other network industries is often overlooked. While the recent analysis and debate on access focuses on the terms of access and the opportunities of competitors to compete with incumbent postal operators, discussion about the nature and effect of mandatory access in a liberalized European postal market is equally needed.1

Keywords

Assure Expense Sorting OECD Undercut 

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Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media New York 2003

Authors and Affiliations

  • Nick van der Lijn
    • 1
  • Arno Meijer
    • 1
  1. 1.ECORYS-NEIThe Netherlands

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