Summary
Based on a recently introduced networked multiagent game [2], we study how agent-agent communications across a complex social network can affect the evolution of the collective during multiple iterations of the game. We show that the information obtained from the social network local to the agent can override the global information source and thus completely change the evolution of the collective compared to the nonnetworked situation. In addition, we show that when trait diversity is low, namely when the agents' action space is severely limited, the overall stability of “leader agents” is improved.
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Toroczkai, Z., Anghel, M., Korniss, G., Bassler, K.E. (2004). Effects of Interagent Communications on the Collective. In: Tumer, K., Wolpert, D. (eds) Collectives and the Design of Complex Systems. Springer, New York, NY. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4419-8909-3_7
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4419-8909-3_7
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