Abstract
The evolving service ecologies show new ways of value co-creation through combinations of multiple service components which are described in service offerings. An open issue in such a large service ecology is how to efficiently coordinate and price service offerings. Service offerings provide different functionality and quality. Customers need to distinguish their preferences on different combinations of service attributes. In this chapter we address this issue of service offerings allocation and introduce a structure design approach, Market Engineering, as an appropriate method to design such mechanism. In order to apply this approach to service systems we introduce a formal model and a definition of service value networks. Examples exemplify our approach and we show one possible step towards implementing such a mechanism.
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Strategic alliances are a well established cooperation in e.g. the airlines industry. Airlines cooperate on selected routes but remain competitors on the other flight routes. The need for cooperation increases also in the service sector since companies offer more and more specialized services.
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The terms service offer, service and node are used interchangeably
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The reverse ownership information \( {\sigma^{ - 1}}:V \to S \) maps service offers to single service providers that own that particular service
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For the reader’s convenience the notion \( {e_{ij}} \) is equivalent to \( {e_{{v_i}{v_j}}} \) representing an interoperable connection of service \( i \in V \) with service \( j \in V \).
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ACID stands for atomicity, consistency, isolation and durability, which are properties that guarantee a reliable transaction.
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van Dinther, C., Blau, B., Conte, T., Weinhardt, C. (2011). Designing Auctions for Coordination in Service Networks. In: Demirkan, H., Spohrer, J., Krishna, V. (eds) The Science of Service Systems. Service Science: Research and Innovations in the Service Economy. Springer, Boston, MA. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4419-8270-4_7
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