Design for Hardware Trust

Chapter

Abstract

Toward further enhancing the effectiveness of postfabrication hardware Trojan detection solutions and alleviating their limitations, as discussed in previous chapters, several methods which rely on modifying the current IC design flow have been developed by the hardware security and trust community. Collectively termed design for hardware trust [1], these Trojan prevention methods aim to prevent insertion and facilitate simple detection of hardware Trojans. In contrast to Trojan detection methods which passively test chips anticipating that the inserted Trojans will be identified based on their abnormal behavior, Trojan prevention methods take a proactive step by changing the circuit structure itself in order to prevent the insertion of Trojans. In order to achieve this goal, the entire IC supply chain needs to be revisited. The resulting modified IC supply chain emphasizes design security to counter Trojan threats and provide a solution for trusted IC design.

Keywords

Assure 

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Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media, LLC 2012

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Department of Electrical EngineeringYale UniversityNew HavenUSA

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