Abstract
With the steady increase in outsourcing of semiconductor integrated circuits (ICs) manufacturing, the concerns for malicious inclusions are increasing within the military and the commercial sectors. Recently, Trojans in ICs used by military equipment have been reported [1]. Trojans can change the functionality of an IC and affect mission critical equipment. Trojans can also disable a system at will. These concerns caused the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) to initiate the Trust in ICs program. This program focuses on developing Trojan detection methods [2, 3].
This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.
Access this chapter
Tax calculation will be finalised at checkout
Purchases are for personal use only
References
Adee S The hunt for the kill switch, IEEE Spectrum, http://www.darpa.mil/mto/solicitations/baa07-24/index.html
Defense Science Board, “Defense Science Board Task Force on High Performance Microchip Supply,” Feb. 2005. http://www.cra.org/govaffairs/images/2005-02-HPMS_Report_Final.pdf
DARPA. http://www.darpa.mil/mto/solicitations/baa07-24/index.html
Karri R, Rajendran J, Rosenfeld K, Tehranipoor M (2010) Trustworthy hardware: identifying and classifying hardware trojans. Computer 43(10): 39–46
Rad RM, Wang X, Tehranipoor M, Plusquellic J (2008) Power supply signal calibration techniques for improving detection resolution to hardware Trojans. In: IEEE/ACM International Conference on Computer-Aided Design, pp632–639, 10–13 Nov 2008
Wolff F, Papachristou C, Bhunia S, Chakraborty RS (2008) Towards trojan-free trusted ICs: problem analysis and detection scheme. In: Design, Automation and Test in Europe, 2008. DATE ’08, pp 1362–1365, 10–14 March 2008
Wang X, Tehranipoor M, Plusquellic J (2008) Detecting malicious inclusions in secure hardware: challenges and solutions. IEEE International Hardware-Oriented Security and Trust (HOST), 2008
Lin L, Burleson W, Paar C (2009) MOLES: malicious off-chip leakage enabled by side-channels. In: IEEE/ACM International Conference on Computer-Aided Design – Digest of Technical Papers, pp 117–122, 2–5 Nov 2009
Baumgarten A, Clausman M, Lindemann B, Steffen M, Trotter B, Zambreno J Embedded Systems Challenge. http://isis.poly.edu/~vikram/iowa_state.pdf
Tamoney A, Kouttron D, Radocea A RPI team: number crunchers. Embedded Systems Challenge. http://isis.poly.edu/~vikram/rpi.pdf
Stefan D, Mitchell C, Almenar C Trojan attacks for compromising cryptographic security in FPGA encryption systems. Embedded Systems Challenge. http://isis.poly.edu/~vikram/cooper.pdf.
Gulurshivaram K, Hailemichael R, Jimenez J, Raju A Implementation of hardware trojans. Embedded Systems Challenge. http://isis.poly.edu/~vikram/poly_team1.pdf
Author information
Authors and Affiliations
Corresponding author
Editor information
Editors and Affiliations
Rights and permissions
Copyright information
© 2012 Springer Science+Business Media, LLC
About this chapter
Cite this chapter
Karri, R., Rajendran, J., Rosenfeld, K. (2012). Trojan Taxonomy. In: Tehranipoor, M., Wang, C. (eds) Introduction to Hardware Security and Trust. Springer, New York, NY. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4419-8080-9_14
Download citation
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4419-8080-9_14
Published:
Publisher Name: Springer, New York, NY
Print ISBN: 978-1-4419-8079-3
Online ISBN: 978-1-4419-8080-9
eBook Packages: EngineeringEngineering (R0)