Competitive location models have been discussed in the location literature since Hotelling’s (1929) seminal paper. As other location contributions, his model includes customers, who are located in some metric space and who have a demand for some good. This demand may be satisfied by firms that offer the product, given some pricing policy. The difference between standard location problems and competitive location models is that in the competitive case, there are at least two competing firms, who offer the same product. Depending on the complexity of the model under consideration, the differences between the firms may include their different locations, prices, pricing policies, or the attractiveness of their respective facilities.
Market Share Sequential Location Reaction Function Single Facility Leader Firm
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The work of the second author was in part supported by a grant from the Natural Sciences and Engineering Council of Canada. This support is much appreciated. Thanks are also due to Professor Vladimir Marianov for his careful reading of the manuscript and for many helpful suggestions.
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