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Equilibria in Competitive Location Models

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Book cover Foundations of Location Analysis

Part of the book series: International Series in Operations Research & Management Science ((ISOR,volume 155))

Abstract

Whereas the usual location models locate facilities based on the wishes and objectives of a single decision maker, competitive location models consider the location of facilities that are under the jurisdiction of more than one decision maker. The economist Hotelling (1929) was the first to introduce competition into location models. His results stood unchallenged for fifty years, until d’Aspremont et al. (1979) corrected an inconsistency that invalidated Hotelling’s main result. Nonetheless, this has not diminished the originality and importance of the original contribution, and it is also the reason why the present paper reviews Hotelling’s contribution and its impact on location models with multiple decision makers.

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Acknowledgments

This work was in part supported by a grant from the Natural Sciences and Engineering Research Council of Canada. This support is gratefully acknowledged. Thanks are also due to an anonymous referee whose comments helped to streamline the paper.

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. Faculty of Business Administration, University of New Brunswick, E3B 5A3, Fredericton, NB, Canada

    H. A. Eiselt

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  1. H. A. Eiselt
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Correspondence to H. A. Eiselt .

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Editors and Affiliations

  1. Faculty of Business Administration, University of New Brunswick, Fredericton,, New Brunswick, Canada

    H. A. Eiselt

  2. Depto. Ingenieria Electrica, Pontificia Universidad Católica de Chile, Av. Vicuna Mackenna 4860, Macul, Santiago, Chile

    Vladimir Marianov

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Eiselt, H.A. (2011). Equilibria in Competitive Location Models. In: Eiselt, H., Marianov, V. (eds) Foundations of Location Analysis. International Series in Operations Research & Management Science, vol 155. Springer, New York, NY. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4419-7572-0_7

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