Towards an Access-Control Framework for Countering Insider Threats

Part of the Advances in Information Security book series (ADIS, volume 49)


As insider threats pose very significant security risks to IT systems, we ask what policy-based approaches to access control can do for the detection, mitigation or countering of insider threats and insider attacks. Answering this question is difficult: little public data about insider-threat cases is available; there is not much consensus about what the insider problem actually is; and previous research in access control has by-and-large not dealt with this issue. We explore existing notions of insiderness in order to identify the relevant research issues. We then formulate a set of requirements for next-generation access-control systems, whose realization might form part of an overall strategy to address the insider problem.


Access Control Policy Language Reputation System User Account Access Request 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.


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Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media, LLC 2010

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Information Security Group, Royal HollowayUniversity of LondonEghamUnited Kingdom
  2. 2.Department of ComputingImperial College LondonLondonUnited Kingdom

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