Facts, Values, and the Naturalistic Fallacy in Psychology

  • Svend Brinkmann


The relationship between facts and values is tremendously intricate in psychology, as in the other human and social sciences, which take as their object of interest human beings as acting persons. Often, two premises are taken for granted in ­scientific psychology: First, that only statements of fact can be objectively true, while statements of value can be nothing but expressions of subjective preferences. Second, that there is an unbridgeable logical gap between factual and evaluative statements so that no descriptive statement can entail an evaluative statement (without the addition of some evaluative premise).


Moral Judgment Constitutive Rule Psychological Phenomenon Moral Fact Function Argument 
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© Springer Science+Business Media, LLC 2011

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Department of Communication and PsychologyUniversity of AalborgAalborgDenmark

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