Abstract
The relationship between facts and values is tremendously intricate in psychology, as in the other human and social sciences, which take as their object of interest human beings as acting persons. Often, two premises are taken for granted in scientific psychology: First, that only statements of fact can be objectively true, while statements of value can be nothing but expressions of subjective preferences. Second, that there is an unbridgeable logical gap between factual and evaluative statements so that no descriptive statement can entail an evaluative statement (without the addition of some evaluative premise).
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Brinkmann, S. (2011). Facts, Values, and the Naturalistic Fallacy in Psychology. In: Psychology as a Moral Science. Springer, New York, NY. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4419-7067-1_5
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