Fringe Consciousness: A Useful Framework for Clarifying the Nature of Experience-Based Metacognitive Feelings
This chapter discusses how inconsistencies in Koriat’s treatment of experience-based metacognitive feelings can be resolved by the integration of ideas and methods from research on fringe consciousness. Experience-based metacognitive feelings are claimed to reflect properties of ongoing cognitive activity, in contrast to information-based metacognitive judgements which are claimed to reflect the content of one’s knowledge. However the empirical examples taken to support the lack of influence of knowledge content are problematic. It is also unclear what the criterion is for defining retrieved knowledge as implicit or explicit. We suggest that theoretical assumptions and empirical examples from research on the overlapping concept of fringe consciousness can help resolve such inconsistencies. The fringe consciousness framework states that metacognitive feelings can be shaped by implicit knowledge content and provides examples of how the implicitness of such knowledge can be measured. We point to some theoretical and empirical implications of a closer integration between these two frameworks.
KeywordsKnowledge Content Implicit Learning Partial Knowledge Explicit Content Context Accessibility
This research was partly supported by a postdoctoral grant (911274) to the first author from the Western Norway Regional Health Authority (Helse Vest).
- Baars, B. J. (1988). A cognitive theory of consciousness. New York: Cambridge University Press.Google Scholar
- Bailey, A. R. (1999). Beyond the fringe: William James on the transitional parts of the stream of consciousness. Journal of Consciousness Studies, 6, 141–153.Google Scholar
- Efklides, A. (2001). Metacognitive experiences in problem solving: Metacognition, motivation, and self-regulation. In A. Efklides, J. Kuhl, & R. M. Sorrentino (Eds.), Trends and prospects in motivation research (pp. 297–323). Dordrecht, The Netherlands: Kluwer.Google Scholar
- Koriat, A., & Levy-Sadot, R. (1999). Processes underlying metacognitive judgements: Information-based and experience-based monitoring of one’s own knowledge. In Y. Trope & S. Chaiken (Eds.), Dual-process theories in social psychology (pp. 483–502). New York: Guildford.Google Scholar
- Mangan, B. (2001). Sensation’s ghost: The non-sensory “fringe” of consciousness. Psyche, 7. Retrieved April 28, 2009 from the World Wide Web: http://psyche.cs.monash.edu.au/v7/psyche-7-18-mangan.html.
- Mangan, B. (2003). The conscious “fringe”: Bringing William James up to date. In B. J. Baars, W. P. Banks, & J. B. Newman (Eds.), Essential sources in the scientific study of consciousness (pp. 741–759). Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press.Google Scholar
- May, J. (2004). An information processing view on fringe consciousness. Psyche, 10, 1–9. Retrieved April 28, 2009 from the World Wide Web: http://psyche.cs.monash.edu.au/symposia/mangan/pdf/may.pdf
- Metcalfe, J. (2000). Metamemory: Theory and data. In E. Tulving & F. I. M. Craik (Eds.), The Oxford handbook of memory (pp. 197–211). London: Oxford University Press.Google Scholar
- Norman, E. (2002). Subcategories of “fringe consciousness” and their related nonconscious contexts. Psyche, 8, 1–15. Retrieved April 28, 2009 from the World Wide Web: http://psyche.cs.monash.edu.au/v8/psyche-8-15-norman.html
- Norman, E., Price, M. C., Blakstad, O., Johnsen, Ø., & Martinsen, S. K. (2009). Measuring the relationship between feeling-of-knowing metamemory judgements and partial knowledge. Manuscript submitted for publication.Google Scholar
- Price, M. C. (2002). Measuring the fringes of experience. Psyche, 8, 1–24. Retrieved April 28, 2009 from the World Wide Web: http://psyche.cs.monash.edu.au/v8/psyche-8-16-price.html.
- Price, M. C., & Norman, E. (2008). Intuitive decisions on the fringes of consciousness: Are they conscious and does it matter? Judgment and Decision Making, 3, 28–41.Google Scholar
- Price, M. C., & Norman, E. (2009). Cognitive feelings. In P. Wilken, T. Bayne, & A. Cleeremans (Eds.), Oxford companion to consciousness (pp. 141–144). Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press.Google Scholar
- Schwartz, B. L. (2002). Tip-of-the-tongue states: Phenomenology, mechanism, and lexical retrieval. Mahwah, NJ: Erlbaum.Google Scholar
- Smith, S. M. (1994). Frustrated feelings of imminent recall: On the tip of the tongue. In J. Metcalfe & A. P. Shimamura (Eds.), Metacognition: Knowing about knowing (pp. 27–45). Cambridge, MA: Bradford.Google Scholar