Sequencing Strategies and Coordination Issues in Outsourcing and Subcontracting Operations

  • Tolga Aydinliyim
  • George L. Vairaktarakis
Part of the International Series in Operations Research & Management Science book series (ISOR, volume 151)


Managing the supply chain has recently been the most significant task for manufacturing companies toward cost efficiency and customer satisfaction. Globalization not only increased the size of supply chains, but also created an environment where competing suppliers, manufacturers, and distributors need to cooperate. Even when firms own a significant portion of their supply chain, multiple parties with different performance measures and goals are involved in the decision-making processes. Examples from the automotive industry include General Motors, Ford Motor Company and others. Each division in such organizations tries to reach optimal plans for the portion of the overall system under its authority. However, the extent to which the individual goals are achieved depends on the decisions made by other parties involved in supply chains. Therefore, the quality of the strategic decisions made by such decision makers depends on the amount of information they have regarding other members of the supply chain. The more information is shared among the decision makers, the greater the resulting coordination benefits.


Supply Chain Cooperative Game Combinatorial Auction Congestion Game Short Processing Time 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.



We would like to thank Professor Reha Uzsoy and two anonymous reviewers for their insightful comments on the earlier versions of this chapter.


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Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media, LLC 2011

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Decision Sciences Department, Charles H. Lundquist College of Business1208 University of OregonEugeneUSA

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