Crime and Corruption



Like intergroup violence (Chap. 7) and insurgency (Chap. 8), crime and ­corruption are nearly inevitable companions of an international intervention. Both contribute to the reasons why the intervention occurs, and both may even grow and fester as side-effects of an intervention. Moreover, crime and corruption frequently serve as obstacles to a successful termination of an intervention.


Bayesian Network Resource Rent Client Relationship Bayesian Optimization Algorithm Computational Social Science 
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© Springer US 2010

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.NPSMontereyUSA

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