Insurgency and Security



More writings about insurgency appeared in the last few years than in the preceding 100 years (Kilcullen 2006). The explosion of interest in the subject has much to do with international interventions: insurgency is among the most difficult challenges that an intervention – military or nonmilitary – may face.


Qualitative Model Political Opinion Influence Diagram International Intervention Public Opinion Poll 
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Copyright information

© Springer US 2010

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Army Research LaboratoryAdelphiUSA

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