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Equilibrium Problems with Equilibrium Constraints

  • Steven A. Gabriel
  • Antonio J. Conejo
  • J. David Fuller
  • Benjamin F. Hobbs
  • Carlos Ruiz
Chapter
Part of the International Series in Operations Research & Management Science book series (ISOR, volume 180)

Abstract

The previous chapter presented mathematical programs for solving leaderfollower (Stackelberg) games when a single leader correctly anticipates the equilibrium reaction of followers, who in turn naively believe that the leader’s decisions are exogenous and fixed. This chapter introduces a type of mathematical program that is useful for modeling such games when there is more than one leader, and one wants to find an equilibrium among them: Equilibrium Problems with Equilibrium Constraints (EPECs). First, we present a general EPEC formulation (Section 7.2) and the basic diagonalization approach to solving EPECs, including a simple example. We then summarize some of their many applications to energy markets (Section 7.3), including the three examples of energy market EPECs that we feature in this chapter.

Keywords

Equilibrium Problem Complementarity Problem Pure Strategy Consumer Surplus Demand Curve 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.

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Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media New York 2013

Authors and Affiliations

  • Steven A. Gabriel
    • 1
  • Antonio J. Conejo
    • 2
  • J. David Fuller
    • 3
  • Benjamin F. Hobbs
    • 4
  • Carlos Ruiz
    • 5
  1. 1.Department of Civil and Environmental EngineeringUniversity of MarylandCollege ParkUSA
  2. 2.University of Castilla – La ManchaCiudad RealSpain
  3. 3.Department of Management SciencesUniversity of WaterlooWaterlooCanada
  4. 4.Department of Geography and Environmental EngineeringThe Johns Hopkins UniversityBaltimoreUSA
  5. 5.European Foundation for New Energy – EDF École Centrale Paris and SupélecChâtenay-MalabryFrance

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