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Electricity and Environmental Markets

  • Steven A. Gabriel
  • Antonio J. Conejo
  • J. David Fuller
  • Benjamin F. Hobbs
  • Carlos Ruiz
Chapter
Part of the International Series in Operations Research & Management Science book series (ISOR, volume 180)

Abstract

The purpose of this chapter is to provide a more in-depth exploration of applications of complementarity models to electricity markets. In doing so, we introduce two crucial features of energy markets. The first is transportation networks with capacity limits on links between different markets. The second is environmental restrictions, such as emissions markets. We address these in turn by building, analyzing, and solving models for electric power markets that incorporate these features.

Keywords

Marginal Cost Equilibrium Problem Electricity Market Environmental Market Transmission System Operator 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.

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Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media New York 2013

Authors and Affiliations

  • Steven A. Gabriel
    • 1
  • Antonio J. Conejo
    • 2
  • J. David Fuller
    • 3
  • Benjamin F. Hobbs
    • 4
  • Carlos Ruiz
    • 5
  1. 1.Department of Civil and Environmental EngineeringUniversity of MarylandCollege ParkUSA
  2. 2.University of Castilla – La ManchaCiudad RealSpain
  3. 3.Department of Management SciencesUniversity of WaterlooWaterlooCanada
  4. 4.Department of Geography and Environmental EngineeringThe Johns Hopkins UniversityBaltimoreUSA
  5. 5.European Foundation for New Energy – EDF École Centrale Paris and SupélecChâtenay-MalabryFrance

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