Spectrum Auctions

  • Karla Hoffman
Part of the International Series in Operations Research & Management Science book series (ISOR, volume 158)


Most developed countries allocate radio spectrum by auction. The Simultaneous Ascending Auction (SAA) has proven to work well for this application. Recently, new designs that allow package bidding have been proposed. These designs have only been tried in the past few years. We first provide some historical background regarding the allocation of spectrum, describe the use of the SAA design and its modifications over the past 15 years, and then highlight the new advances in combinatorial auction designs and their use for the allocation of spectrum.


Federal Communication Commission Combinatorial Auction Auction Mechanism Winning Bidder Clock Phase 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.


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Copyright information

© Springer New York 2011

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Systems Engineering and Operations Research DepartmentGeorge Mason UniversityFairfaxUSA

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