Strategic Voting in a Bicameral Setting

Part of the Studies in Public Choice book series (SIPC, volume 16)


Recent work on roll call votes has demonstrated the importance of considering more explicitly the agenda tree that leads to the votes considered. When doing so, the issue of whether members of parliament behave sincerely or in a sophisticated manner comes to the forefront. While a series of studies have, on the basis of examples mostly taken from the US Congress, tried to analyze with the help of theoretical models sophisticated voting, few studies have considered this type of voting in a bicameral setting. This study proposes a game–theoretic model of sophisticated voting in a bicameral parliament. Assuming incomplete information on the preferences across the two chambers, the analysis demonstrates that in bicameral settings sophisticated voting cannot be considered chamber by chamber, but has to be analyzed in the context of the whole voting process.


Strategic Vote Veto Player European Parliament Nash Bargaining Solution Agenda Control 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.



I wish to thank the participants at these events, especially Marcelo Jenny, as well as Bjørn Hoyland for the helpful comments and the Swiss National Science Foundation (Grant No 100012-111909) for its generous funding.


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Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media, LLC 2011

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Département de science politique, Faculté des sciences économiques et socialesUniversité de GenèveGenevaSwitzerland

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