Security and Privacy Protection of Contactless Devices

Conference paper


This chapter presents some new developments for the security and privacy protection of the future contactless smart devices. The main objective is to anticipate the forthcoming expectation from consumers and citizens for high level of trust and confidence about the next contactless nomadic devices by creating a private sphere where they will have full control to manage contactless transactions. The first objective is to build some mechanism and probably associated specific devices to offer to the user the capabilities for privacy management with the awareness of the local RF activity, the avoidance of any digital transaction without the consent of the owner of the data, the control of all the exchanged data with checking through a display, and the personal management of black lists of nonauthorized devices. To raise trust and confidence, these functions would be managed by a specific device, a so-called Contactless Privacy Manager that will be user-centric. The second objective is to secure the contactless link in order to provide a private data exchange with noisy readers.


Smart Device Differential Power Analysis Electronic Purse Relay Attack Contactless Card 


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Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media, LLC 2010

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Commissariat à l’énergie atomique, LETIGrenobleFrance

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