Data Integrity and Message Authentication

  • Catherine H. Gebotys
Part of the Embedded Systems book series (EMSY)


The integrity of encrypted data was a cause for concern in the banking industry in the 1970s. They wanted to be sure that attackers were not able to modify data especially since the data, in this case, was financial. As a result many standards for integrity and authentication as well as authenticated encryption (Bellare et al. 2003) have been established (FIPS180-3 2008; FIPS198a 2002) and are being developed (SHA-3 2008). This chapter will introduce the basic properties and structure of data integrity functions including message authentication. In general, if confidentiality and assurance or authentication of confidentiality of data is important then authenticated encryption schemes (discussed in Sect. 6.5) should be used. Cryptographic hash functions and message authentication codes (MACs) are discussed in this chapter. Integrity trees will also be discussed as an application of these integrity functions. Some initial terminology is provided below as an aid to understanding concepts which will be developed in this chapter.

It provides assurance that the data has not been modified from its original state. Integrity is provided by hash functions. In general, these hashes are computed and then protected in some manner for verifying the data again at some time in the future. Hash functions combined with other properties (one-way, collision resistance) provide modification detection codes (MDCs) or message integrity codes (MICs).


Hash Function External Memory Replay Attack Message Authentication Code Memory Block 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.


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Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media, LLC 2010

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Department of Electrical & Computer EngineeringUniversity of WaterlooWaterlooCanada

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