Secret Key Extraction from Level Crossings over Unauthenticated Wireless Channels

  • Suhas Mathur
  • Wade Trappe
  • Narayan Mandayam
  • Chunxuan Ye
  • Alex Reznik


Many of the risks associated with securing wireless systems stem from challenges associated with operating in a mobile environment, such as the lack of a guaranteed infrastructure or the ease with which entities can eavesdrop on communications. Traditional network security mechanisms rely upon cryptographic keys to support confidentiality and authentication services. However, in a dynamic mobile wireless environment, with peer-to-peer associations being formed on-the-fly between mobile entities, it is difficult to ensure availability of a certificate authority or a key management center. Since such scenarios are likely to become more prevalent, it is necessary to have alternatives for establishing keys between wireless peers without resorting to a fixed infrastructure.


Channel Impulse Response Message Authentication Code Level Crossing Probe Request Maximum Doppler Frequency 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.


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Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media, LLC 2009

Authors and Affiliations

  • Suhas Mathur
    • 1
  • Wade Trappe
    • 1
  • Narayan Mandayam
    • 1
  • Chunxuan Ye
    • 2
  • Alex Reznik
    • 2
  1. 1.Wireless Information Network Laboratory (WINLAB)Rutgers UniversityNorth Brunswick, NJUSA
  2. 2.InterDigitalKing of Prussia, PAUSA

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