Equity Financing

  • Paul Gompers
  • Josh Lerner
Part of the International Handbook Series on Entrepreneurship book series (IHSE, volume 5)


Equity financing for entrepreneurial firms has attracted increasing attention in both the popular press and academic literature. The dramatic growth in the venture capital industry in past two decades has been accompanied by new academic research that explores its form and function. Angel financing, while less well-understood, is also attracting attention. At the same time, many of the questions that are most critical to policy-makers remain unanswered. Thus, this chapter has a twofold role: to summarize and synthesize what we do know about equity finance from recent research, and to indicate the important questions that we cannot yet answer.


Venture Capital Initial Public Offering Private Equity Equity Financing Entrepreneurial Firm 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.


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Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media, LLC 2010

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Harvard Business SchoolBostonUSA

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