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Global Warming pp 407-421 | Cite as

Game Analysis of Kyoto and Post-Kyoto Schemes

  • Haruo Imai
Chapter
Part of the Green Energy and Technology book series (GREEN)

Abstract

Game theory is a tool utilized in economics to analyze the consequences of interaction among rational agents. It has been found to be especially useful for evaluating the workings of economic schemes at the theoretical level and also designing a possible mechanism to improve the economic system. In environmental economics, the use of game theory is most prominent in the analysis of IEAs (international environmental agreements), and the current negotiations on post-Kyoto (or post-2012) present a potential interesting application of game theory. Furthermore, such studies inspire further use of game theoretical tools in the study of such issues. In this chapter, we examine game theory analysis in this context and suggest some further directions of study with an emphasis on the role played by one particular mechanism under the Kyoto protocol (KP) called the CDM (clean development mechanism).

Keywords

Emission Reduction Clean Development Mechanism Kyoto Protocol Emission Trading Grand Coalition 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.

Notes

Acknowledgments

We appreciate comments made at the first World Congress of global warming and, in particular, to the anonymous referees who provided information not contained in the earlier version. Furthermore, financial aid from the Grants in Aid (20330037) of the Japanese Society for Promotion of Science and Sumitomo Foundation is gratefully acknowledged.

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Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media, LLC 2010

Authors and Affiliations

  • Haruo Imai
    • 1
  1. 1.Kyoto UniversityKyotoJapan

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