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Spatial Optimality of Cultures

  • Rongxing Guo
Chapter

Abstract

Why have some small culture areas formed larger ones, while those large culture areas eventually disintegrated? Why are unions formed by culturally heterogeneous economies sometimes less stable and efficient than those formed by culturally homogeneous economies with different political systems? In this chapter, a model of spatial efficiency (optimality) of cultures is constructed to explain the integration and break up of culture areas. On the basis of this model, four propositions relating to the equilibrium location of and the optimal size of cultures are derived, and their political economy implications to the interactions between cultures differing in size are illustrated. The analytic narratives indicate that the increasing complexity of managing a culture area that either grows beyond a certain size or has locational disadvantages is the major source of cultural inefficiencies.

Keywords

Korean Peninsula Culture Area Song Dynasty Ming Dynasty Tang Dynasty 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.

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Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media, LLC 2009

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Regional Science Association of China at Peking UniversityBeijingChina

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