Equilibria and Inefficiency in Traffic Networks with Stochastic Capacity and Information Provision

  • Tian-Liang Liu
  • Hai-Jun Huang
  • Hai Yang
  • Xiaolei Guo


In this paper, we study the inefficiencies of various behavior equilibria in traffic networks with stochastic capacity and information provision. Variational inequality models are presented to formulate the travel behaviors associated with user equilibrium (UE) with imperfect information, system optimum (SO) with imperfect information and system optimum with perfect information, respectively. The tight upper bounds of inefficiencies caused by UE selfish behavior with imperfect information are analytically discussed in detail. It is found that when link travel time functions are all polynomial, the worst-case inefficiencies against the SOs with imperfect or perfect information are dependent upon the steepness degree of link time functions and independent of the network topology. The upper bound of inefficiency against the SO with perfect information is yet dependent upon the degradation degree and occurring probability density of link capacity. Furthermore, it is also found that perfect information can always improve the traffic network performance whilst imperfect information has the same worst-case efficiency as zero information.


Traffic Network Travel Behavior Perfect Information Link Capacity Imperfect Information 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.


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The research described here was supported by a grant from the National Natural Science Foundation of China (70521001), a project from the National Basic Research Program of China (2006CB705503), and a grant from the Research Grants Council of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region, China (HKUST6215/06E).


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© Springer-Verlag US 2009

Authors and Affiliations

  • Tian-Liang Liu
    • 1
  • Hai-Jun Huang
    • 1
  • Hai Yang
    • 2
  • Xiaolei Guo
    • 2
  1. 1.Beijing University of Aeronautics and AstronauticsHong-KongChina
  2. 2.The Hong Kong University of Science and TechnologyHong KongChina

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