A Game Theoretic Approach to the Determination of Hyperpaths in Transportation Networks

  • Jan-Dirk Schmöcker
  • Michael G.H. Bell
  • Fumitaka Kurauchi
  • Hiroshi Shimamoto


In transit assignment, the common lines problem leads to the notion of a hyperpath, which is a set of paths that when used according to the “take whichever attractive line arrives next” strategy minimises the expected travel time. Similarly, the game theoretic approach to risk-averse traffic assignment leads to the generation of a set of paths which minimises expected travel time when a pessimistic assumption is made about on-trip events. The equivalence between the hyperpath of transit assignment and the set of paths generated by a multi-agent, zero sum game is shown in this paper. In particular, game theory is used to show that the path split probabilities proposed by Spiess and Florian (1989) are optimal for the risk-averse traveller who needs to make an on-the-spot decision between alternative routes. An alternative two-agent (single demon), zero-sum game is considered. The results of the multiple- and two-agent games are compared on a small example network, showing that the single demon game can lead to denser hyperpaths.


Travel Time Transportation Network Route Choice Transit Network Transportation Research Part 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.


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Copyright information

© Springer-Verlag US 2009

Authors and Affiliations

  • Jan-Dirk Schmöcker
    • 1
  • Michael G.H. Bell
    • 2
  • Fumitaka Kurauchi
    • 3
  • Hiroshi Shimamoto
    • 4
  1. 1.Tokyo Institute of TechnologyTokyoJapan
  2. 2.Imperial College LondonLondonU.K
  3. 3.Gifu UniversityTokyoJapan
  4. 4.Hiroshima UniversityTokyoJapan

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