Of Threats and Costs: A Game-Theoretic Approach to Security Risk Management

Chapter
Part of the Springer Optimization and Its Applications book series (SOIA, volume 46)

Abstract

Security is one of the main concerns in current telecommunication networks: the service providers and individual users have to protect themselves against attacks, and to this end a careful analysis of their optimal strategies is of essential importance. Indeed, attackers and defenders are typically agents trying strategically to design the most important damages and the most secure use of the resources, respectively, and the natural modelling framework of these interactions is that of noncooperative game theory. This chapter aims at providing a comprehensive review of game-theoretic aspects of security. We first describe the basics on game theory through simple security problems, and then present and discuss some specific problems in more detail. Finally, we also deal with security economics, focusing on the selfish relationships between customers and providers as well as between competing providers, which represents another important aspect of our non-standard approach towards security risk assessement.

Keywords

Expense Nash Defend Folk Monopoly 

Notes

Acknowledgments

The authors acknowledge the support of European initiative COST IS0605, Econ@tel. Part of this work has been supported by the Austrian government and the city of Vienna in the framework of the COMET competence centre program and by the French research agency through the FLUOR project.

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Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media, LLC 2011

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Institut TelecomCesson-Sévigné CedexFrance
  2. 2.Telecom BretagneCesson-Sévigné CedexFrance
  3. 3.Telecommunications Research Center Vienna (ftw.)WienAustria
  4. 4.INRIA Rennes – Bretagne AtlantiqueRennes CedexFrance

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