The Need to Foster Revolutionary Science



Nanotechnology, as described in previous chapters, holds great promise and presents potential threats for US efforts in chemical and biological (CB) defense. In this rapidly changing world, the possibility of harm from nanotechnologies is real. A more likely possibility, however, is improved technologies across many defense and civilian sectors, and specifically in CB defense. It is increasingly apparent that in the next 30 years, CB defense could benefit substantially from a well-executed strategic vision for unique nanotechnology capabilities and nano-enabled science and technology. In accordance with these emerging unconventional threats, the national security community must respond in unconventional ways. The technical challenges to realizing robust CB defense utilizing nanotechnology (described in Chapters 3 and 5) and the misuse of well-intentioned development (described in Chapter 4) are not the only barriers. Nontechnical barriers (including those noted in Chapter 1) must be overcome both to realize technical goals and to address the potential proliferation of nanotechnologically enabled CB weapons. This chapter will focus on institutional factors – domestic, international, and disciplinary – and policy recommendations.


Nanotechnology Research National Nanotechnology Initiative Civilian Sector Chemical Weapon Convention Nonstate Actor 
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Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media, LLC 2009

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Georgia Institute of TechnologySam Nunn School of International Affairs Center for International StrategyMariettaUSA

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