Extensive Games

Chapter
Part of the Synthese Library book series (SYLI, volume 346)

Abstract

Game theorists may disagree about the suitability of one or another normal form solution concept—there are many—but a brief inspection of the literature will show that they rarely disagree about the correct epistemic characterisation of each solution concept. For extensive games, while several solution concepts are available, the most obvious candidate is certainly in most cases backward induction (the subgame-perfect (Nash) equilibrium). Ironically, however, game theorists widely disagree about its correct epistemic characterisation, and the disagreement centres on the question of whether or not common true belief about rationality leads to backward induction. Robert Aumann defends a position in favour of this implication, Philip Reny objects, and both positions are taken by various other theorists.

Keywords

Nash Defend Broome 

Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media B.V. 2010

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Faculty of PhilosophyUniversity of GroningenGroningenThe Netherlands

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