Abstract
Definitions of time symmetry and examples of time-directed behaviour are discussed in the framework of discrete Markov processes. It is argued that typical examples of time-directed behaviour can be described using time-symmetric transition probabilities. Some current arguments in favour of a distinction between past and future on the basis of probabilistic considerations are thereby seen to be invalid.
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Notes
- 1.
Note that Markov processes are indeed sometimes used in the context of thermodynamics to explain the thermodynamic arrow in terms of a ‘probabilistic arrow of time’. Uffink (2007, Section 7) has independently criticised such attempts in a way that is very close to the ideas expressed in this paper.
- 2.
For a good introduction to the complex theme of ergodic theory in the deterministic case, see Uffink (2007, Section 6).
- 3.
My thanks to Werner Ehm for discussions about this notion.
- 4.
In the case of denumerable state space, assume there are non-zero currents in equilibrium but no circular currents. Let us say that, between s and t, state 0 gains probability É› from states \(1,\ldots,i_1\) (distinct from 0). Obviously, \(\sum_{i=1}^{i_1}p_i(s)\geq\varepsilon\). In the same time interval, the states \(1,\ldots,i_1\) must gain probability at least É› from some states \(i_1+1,\ldots,i_2\) (all distinct from \(0,\ldots,i_1\)), and \(\sum_{i=i_1+1}^{i_2}p_i(s)\geq\varepsilon\). Therefore \(\sum_{i=1}^{i_2}p_i(s)\geq 2\varepsilon\). Repeat the argument until \(\sum_{i=1}^{i_n}p_i(s)\geq n\varepsilon>1\), which is impossible.
- 5.
Conditionalising on two different equilibrium distributions (if there are several ergodic classes) will not yield different backwards transition frequencies, because the transition frequencies are fixed separately in each ergodic class.
- 6.
My thanks to Iain Martel for making this point in conversation.
- 7.
A more detailed introduction to Nelson’s approach, including an explicit discussion of time symmetry and the status of the transition probabilities, is given in Bacciagaluppi (2005). As Nelson’s approach relates to de Broglie and Bohm’s pilot-wave theory, so Guerra and Marra’s discrete case relates to the stochastic versions of pilot-wave theory, known as ‘beable’ theories, defined by Bell (1984).
- 8.
Observation in these cases, however, is definitely not classical. If one includes observers in the description (by adding some appropriate quantum mechanical interaction), when they gain knowledge about the state of the process, thus narrowing their epistemic distribution over the states, they effectively modify the wave function of the system, thus effectively modifying also the transition probabilities of the process, both forwards and backwards. (Note that convergence behaviour would thus be altered if monitored.)
- 9.
The notion of a constraint is of course more intuitive when one is talking about a subsystem on which one performs experiments (as in thermodynamics or statistical mechanics when compressing a gas into a small volume), but it is meant to apply generally. As emphasised by the anonymous referee, in the case of a stochastic theory such constraints will not only be ‘special’ in some sense but they will be improbable in the sense specified by the process itself. The further question of whether and how the contingent trajectories (or distributions) should be explained thus acquires a new twist as compared to the deterministic case.
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Acknowledgements
The first version of this paper was written while I was an Alexander-von-Humboldt Fellow at the Institut für Grenzgebiete der Psychologie und Psychohygiene (IGPP), Freiburg i. Br. I wish to thank in particular Werner Ehm at IGPP, Iain Martel, then at the University of Konstanz, and David Miller at the Centre for Time, University of Sydney, for useful discussions and suggestions, as well as Mauricio Suárez for the kind invitation to contribute to this volume and an anonymous referee for interesting comments.
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Appendix
Appendix
We now prove that symmetry of the transition probabilities (2.19), together with the further assumptions that the state space is finite and that the transition probabilities are continuous, implies equilibrium of the process.
We proceed by induction on the size n of the state space. The case \(n=1\) is trivial. Assume that the result has been proved for all sizes \(1\leq m<n\). We now prove it for n by reductio.
Assume that the single-time distribution is not invariant, i.e.
For the rest of the proof we now fix such an s.
Since we assume (2.19), i.e. \(P(t|s)=P(s|t)\), we also have
and therefore
Now fix a time \(t\geq s\) and consider the matrix \(P:=P(t|s)^2\). This is an \(n\times n\) stochastic matrix that we can consider as the transition matrix of a homogeneous Markov process with discrete time. By (2.53), \(\textbf{p}(t)\) and \(\textbf{p}(s)\) are both invariant distributions for this Markov process, and by (2.51) they are different.
By the ergodic theorem for discrete-time Markov processes, existence of at least two different invariant distributions implies that there are at least two ergodic classes. Therefore (whether or not there are any transient states), P must have a block diagonal form
where P ′ is an \(m\times m\) matrix and P ″ an \((n-m)\times (n-m)\) matrix, for some \(0<m <n\).
For fixed s, \(P=P(t|s)^2\) depends on t, and so a priori could m; but in fact \(m(t)\) is independent of t. Indeed, assume there is an \(m\neq m(t)\) such that for all \(\varepsilon>0\) there is a \(t'\) with \(|t-t'|<\varepsilon\) and \(m(t')=m\). The matrix elements of \(P=P(t|s)^2\), in particular the ones off the diagonal blocks, are continuous functions of the transition probabilities. Therefore, by the continuity of the transition probabilities, \(P(t|s)^2\) must also have zeros off the same diagonal blocks, i.e. \(m=m(t)\), contrary to assumption. Therefore, for each \(m\neq m(t)\) there is an \(\varepsilon(m)>0\) such that for all t ′ with \(|t-t'|<\varepsilon(m)\) we have \(m(t')\neq m\). Taking the smallest of these finitely many \(\varepsilon(m)>0\), call it ɛ 0, it follows that \(m(t')=m(t)\) for all \(t'\) in the open ɛ 0-neighbourhood around t. However, again by the continuity of the matrix elements, this ɛ 0-neighbourhood is also closed, and therefore it is the entire real line. Since t was arbitrary, \(P(t|s)^2\) has the form (2.54) with the same m for all \(t\geq s\).
We now focus on the matrix \(P(t|s)\) itself rather than on \(P(t|s)^2\). Assume that for some \(t\geq s\) it has some element \(p_{k|l}(t|s)\) outside of the \(m\times m\) and \((n-m)\times (n-m)\) diagonal blocks. In order for \(P(t|s)^2\) to have the given block diagonal form, several other elements of \(P(t|s)\) have to be zero, in particular all elements in the k-th column of \(P(t|s)\) that lie inside the corresponding diagonal block.
Since \(P(t|s)\) is a stochastic matrix and every column sums to 1, it follows that already those elements of the k-th column that lie outside the diagonal blocks sum to 1, and therefore the sum of all elements in the diagonal blocks of \(P(t|s)\), call it \(d(t)\), is at most \(n-1\), i.e.
for any \(t\geq s\) such that \(P(t|s)\) has some element outside of the diagonal blocks. Let t 0 be the infimum of such t. By continuity, we have also
Now, if \(t_0\neq s\), then for all \(t<t_0\) we have that \(d(t)=n\), but then by continuity \(d(t_0)=n\), contradicting (2.56). If instead \(t_0=s\), since \(P(s|s)=\textbf{1}\), we again have \(d(t_0)=n\), contradicting (2.56). For all \(t\geq s\), thus, \(P(t|s)\) has the same block diagonal form as \(P(t|s)^2\) with fixed m.
But then, our original Markov process decomposes into two sub-processes, with state spaces of size m and \(n-m\), respectively. If \(\textbf{p}(t)\neq\textbf{p}(s)\) (assumption (2.51)), then the same must be true for at least one of the two sub-processes, but, by the inductive assumption, this is impossible. Therefore, (2.51) is false and
QED.
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Bacciagaluppi, G. (2011). Probability and Time Symmetry in Classical Markov Processes. In: Suárez, M. (eds) Probabilities, Causes and Propensities in Physics. Synthese Library, vol 347. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4020-9904-5_2
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