Parmenides of Elea (ca. 515–450 B.C.)
‘What is Being’? The question may seem superfluous – the response a mere tautology: ‘Being is to be’. Or could it be that the question is not so simple as it first appears? ‘What, precisely, is the nature of Being’? A tree in the garden is a being, so is myself, the city, a poem by Edgar Allan Poe, Beethoven’s Third Symphony. All these are beings insofar as they exist. That is self-evident and incontestable, so the question remains unanswered, ‘what exactly does Being mean’? What is that which makes up the Being in the being, that which makes it be a being instead of non-being? The word on (being) in ancient Greek held a two-fold meaning: first, that which ‘is’, the being itself, that which exists; and, second, that by virtue of which something exists – that which constitutes the ‘Being’ in the ‘being’, if it is a being.
KeywordsNonstandard Analysis True Conviction Contradictory Conclusion Logical Principle Empirical World
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