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Making Environmental Administration More Effective: A Contribution from New Institutional Economics

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Institutions and Sustainability

Abstract

During the past 40 years, many countries have adopted policies and laws aimed at protecting the environment and ensuring the sustainable management of natural resources. Yet implementing such policies and laws requires efficient public administration. This chapter presents a conceptual framework that identifies the factors influencing the performance of environmental ministries, departments and agencies (MDAs). Based on this framework, the chapter explores how New Institutional Economics, specifically transaction cost economics, can be applied to derive hypotheses regarding the institutional design of environmental MDAs. Four questions concerning institutional design are discussed: To which extent should environmental functions be integrated into sector ministries? What is the appropriate level of autonomy for different MDAs? What is the appropriate level of decentralization? And how should they interact with civil society and the private sector? The case of Uganda is used to illustrate the arguments derived from the transaction cost approach.

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Birner, R., Wittmer, H. (2009). Making Environmental Administration More Effective: A Contribution from New Institutional Economics. In: Beckmann, V., Padmanabhan, M. (eds) Institutions and Sustainability. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4020-9690-7_8

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