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A Survey of Ranking Theory

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Degrees of Belief

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. Department of Philosophy, Universität Konstanz, 78457 Konstanz, Germany

    Wolfgang Spohn

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  1. Wolfgang Spohn
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Editors and Affiliations

  1. Formal Epistemology Research Group Zukunftskolleg and Department of Philosophy, University of Konstanz, P.O. Box X906, 78457 Konstanz, Germany

    Franz Huber

  2. Department of Philosophy, University of Leipzig, 04009 Leipzig, Germany

    Christoph Schmidt-Petri

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Spohn, W. (2009). A Survey of Ranking Theory. In: Huber, F., Schmidt-Petri, C. (eds) Degrees of Belief. Synthese Library, vol 342. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4020-9198-8_8

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