Accuracy and Coherence: Prospects for an Alethic Epistemology of Partial Belief

  • James M. Joyce
Part of the Synthese Library book series (SYLI, volume 342)


Brier Score Credence Function Epistemic Evaluation Objective Chance Partial Belief 
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Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media B.V. 2009

Authors and Affiliations

  • James M. Joyce
    • 1
  1. 1.Department of PhilosophyUniversity of MichiganAnn ArborUSA

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