Who One Is pp 345-422 | Cite as

The Paradoxes of the Transcendental Person

Part of the Phaenomenologica book series (PHAE, volume 189)

Paradox in philosophy is typically not well received and its sense here is given clarification within the transcendental phenomenological context. Within this context there is the basic tension between what, for the natural attitude, is a part, i.e., the transcendental I, that appears to swallow up the whole, i.e., the world. For Husserl the wrestle with these matters is the thematization of “the transcendental person, i.e., how the transcendental perspective may transform the natural perspective on the person. Here the distinction surfaces between the lived sense of the body and the body as a physical thing in the world. Similarly here the ethical-axiological-political theme of the dignity of the human person as incommensurate with things in the world finds its foundation. Likewise undertaken here is a discussion of the peculiar senses in which the transcendental I is both contingent and necessary in ways not commensurate with the contingency and necessity of the displayed world. These matters are connected to but not identical with the other tension of the third-person natural-scientific perspective being subordinated to the first-person one and vice-versa. This is the focus of a review of regional ontological discussions of mind-body relations.


Human Person Natural Attitude Transcendental Phenomenology Individual Essence Immaterial Substance 
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© Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2009

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