Who One Is pp 269-344 | Cite as

Ontology and Meontology of I-ness

Part of the Phaenomenologica book series (PHAE, volume 189)

“Meontology” can be short-hand for the range of issues attached to the non-ascriptive, non-identifying knowledge of the non-sortal referent of “I” in contrast to the identifying knowledge we have of everything else, including persons. Who one is is not in every respect coincident with what one is and who one is is not in every respect individuated by what one is. We adopt the thesis that who one is as “the myself” is individuated per se, that what “I” refers to is a substance that individuates itself (Husserl). There is a sense of oneself that is not individuated by being in space-time or any other extrinsic or per accidens considerations, such as those of a biological or cultural nature. This thesis is inseparable from the claim that what “I” refers to is an individual essence or haecceity, and the thesis that there is a coincidence of the bare particular substrate I and the concretum or eidetic singularity (definite description). If we take numerical identity to mean that it is meaningful to say that something is not two, then what “I” refers to is not a numerical identity (Hönigswald).


Definite Description Unique Essence Bare Substrate Numerical Identity Primal Presencing 
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© Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2009

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