Who One Is pp 173-268 | Cite as

Love as the Fulfillment of the Second-Person Perspective

Part One: The Second-Person Perspective
Part of the Phaenomenologica book series (PHAE, volume 189)

In this chapter there is a general discussion of the presencing of Others in empathic perception and foremost the unique presencing in the second-person. A distinctive form of second-person reference is the “social-communicative” or “illocutionary act.” Second-person reference requires making comparisons with first-person reference, e.g., how there is a form of the presencing of the You which is non-ascriptive and non-criterial, and how this has parallels with proper names. The difference between “person” and the “myself” in the first-person leads to the question of whether this difference is discernible in second-person reference and whether the intentionality of love may be said to target and display the Other in her own sphere of “ownness” and the “myself.” Our affirmative answer, partially inspired by McTaggart, is that love displays the other “myself” through, but as beyond, the properties by which we make present her personal presence. Love as a unique celebratory affirmation of the otherness of the Other may be caused or occasioned by the Other’s loveable qualities but properly it is not in respect to qualities of the Other but to the ipseity which transcends these.


Unique Essence Chapter Versus Declarative Sentence Common Life Individual Essence 
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© Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2009

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