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Who One Is pp 133-171 | Cite as

Ipseity's Ownness and Uniqueness

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Part of the Phaenomenologica book series (PHAE, volume 189)

Because I-ness pervades self-awareness, foremost the pre-reflective and reflective forms, there are the phenomena of ownness, being and having, as well as spirit and soul which are prior to any contrast-effect derived from meeting other I’s. Because the first-person non-reflective and indexical knowledge of oneself is non-ascriptive, non-criterial, non-identifying knowledge, we must distinguish the knowing of oneself as a person and the non-sortal knowing of oneself as the “myself.” This latter is a awareness of oneself as a unique essence and here no ascription of properties is in play. “Person” as propertied or sortal would seem in principle duplicatable. Yet we must deal with the question of how person is tied to individual “personality” and personal style. Following especially Erich Klawonn we hold the answer to the question of whether what “I” refers to may have an ontological clone to be different in the first-person and third-person. All this is connected to the question of how the transcendental “pure” I is the same and differs from “the myself.”

Keywords

Transcendental Phenomenology Possessive Pronoun Individual Essence Strict Identity Passive Synthesis 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.

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© Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2009

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