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Who One Is pp 65-132 | Cite as

The First Person and the Transcendental I

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Part of the Phaenomenologica book series (PHAE, volume 189)

Besides the work of Husserl, also that especially of H.-N. Castañeda and Sydney Shoemaker inform this transcendental phenomenological study of “I.” The primacy of first-person experience and reference along with the impossibility of substituting other third-person or second-person forms for the first-person are argued for. There is an adumbration of the transcendental I in the I’s functioning as the responsible agent of manifestation (Robert Sokolowski). There is highlighted the non-ascriptive reference of self-awareness and the first-person indexical reference to oneself as oneself. The basic self-awareness is non-reflective and always pervaded by an at least anonymous I-ness. We address opponents such as Humeans, Buddhists and even Castañeda. Inseparable from this discussion is the analysis of what a “perspective” is, what “first-person perspective” means, and the relation of reflection to first-person perspective.

Keywords

Personal Pronoun Transcendental Phenomenology Individual Essence Demonstrative Pronoun Prior Familiarity 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.

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© Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2009

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