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Noematic Sinn

General meaning-function or propositional content?
  • Christian Beyer
Part of the Phaenomenologica book series (PHAE, volume 187)

In the first of his Logical Investigations (LI), sec. 26, Husserl introduces the semantic distinction between an expression’s general meaning-function, on the one hand, and the propositional, or sub-propositional, content — the “respective meaning” — expressed in a given context of utterance, on the other.1 If, for example, you and I both say “I”, then our two utterances share the same general-meaning function but express different respective meanings, with different referents. According to Husserl, it is the respective meaning, rather than the general meaning-function, that determines the expression’s referent, in the sense that two expressions sharing that meaning are bound to refer to the same object(s), if any.

Keywords

Perceptual Experience Perceptual Object Intentional Object Intentional Content Phenomenological Perspective 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.

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Copyright information

© Springer Science + Business Media B.V 2008

Authors and Affiliations

  • Christian Beyer
    • 1
  1. 1.Erfurt

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