Abstract
Over many years, interpersonal comparisons of utility have had a significant role to play in economics. Utility began as a basic concept on which Prances Hutcheson, Cesare Beccarla, Jeremy Bentham, John Stuart Mill, and Henry Sidgwick sought to build a general ethical theory that is simple yet profound. The resulting classical utilitarian theory relied on interpersonal comparisons because it required a common unit with which to measure each person’s pleasure or happiness, before adding to arrive at a measure of total happiness. According to the standard reading of Bentham, one should then proceed to subtract each person’s pain or misery, also measured in the same common unit, in order to arrive at a measure of total utility.1
This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.
Preview
Unable to display preview. Download preview PDF.
Similar content being viewed by others
References
Arneson, R. (1989). Equality and Equal Opportunity for Welfare. Philosophical Studies, 56:77–93.
Arneson, R. (1990). Liberalism, Distributive Subjectivism, and Equal Opportunity for Welfare. Philosophy and Public Affairs, 19:158–194.
Arrow, K. J. (1950). A Difficulty in the Concept of Social Welfare. Journal of Political Economy, 58:328–346. Reprinted in Arrow (1983), chapter 1, pp. 1-29.
Arrow, K. J. (1951, 1963). Social Choice and Individual Values. Yale University Press, New Haven, 2 edition.
Arrow, K. J. (1971). A Utilitarian Approach to the Concept of Equality in Public Expenditure. Quarterly Journal of Economics, 85:409–415.
Arrow, K. J. (1977). Extended Sympathy and the Possibility of Social Choice. American Economic Review (Papers and Proceedings), 67:219–225. Reprinted in Arrow (1983), chapter 11, pp. 147-161.
Arrow, K. J. (1983). Collected Papers of Kenneth J. Arrow, Vol. 1: Social Choice and Justice. The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Mass.
Arrow, K. J., Chenery, H. B., Minhas, B. S., and Solow, R. M. (1961). Capital-Labor Substitution and Economic Efficiency. Review of Economics and Statistics, 43:225–250.
Atkinson, A. B. (1970). On the Measurement of Inequality. Journal of Economic Theory, 2:244–263.
Atkinson, A. B. (1995). Public Economics in Action. The Basic Income-Flat Tax Proposal. Oxford University Press, Oxford.
Bandyopadhyay, T. (1988). Revealed Preference Theory, Ordering and the Axiom of Sequential Path Independence. Review of Economic Studies, 55:343–351.
Barone, E. (1908). Il ministero della produzione nello stato colletivista. Giornale degli Economisti, 37:267–293 and 391-414. Translated as “The Ministry of Production in the Collectivist State” in F. A. Hayek (ed.) (1935), Collectivist Economic Planning (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul), pp. 310-334; reprinted in P. Newman (ed.), Readings in Mathematical Economics, Vol. I: Value Theory (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press).
Barten, A. P. (1964). Family Composition, Price, and Expenditure Patterns. In Hart, P., Mills, G., and Whitaker, J. K., editors, Econometric Analysis for National Economic Planning (16th Symposium of the Colston Society), pages 277–292. Butterworth, London.
Becht, M. (1995). The Theory and Estimation of Individual and Social Welfare Measures. Journal of Economic Surveys, 9:53–87.
Berg, M. and Lepelley, D. (1994). On Probability Models in Voting Theory. Statistica Neerlandica, 48:133–146.
Bergson, A. (1954). On the Concept of Social Welfare. The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 68:233–252.
Black, D. (1948). On the Rationale of Group Decision Making. Journal of Political Economy, 56:23–34.
Blackorby, C., Bossert, W., and Donaldson, D. (1995). Intertemporal Population Ethics: Critical-Level Utilitarian Principles. Econometrica, 63:1303–1320.
Blackorby, C., Bossert, W., and Donaldson, D. (1996). Intertemporally Consistent Population Ethics: Classical Utilitarian Principles. In Arrow, K. J., Sen, A. K., and Suzumura, K., editors, Social Choice Re-Examined, volume 2, chapter 13, pages 137–162. Macmillan, London. IEA Conference Volume, no. 117.
Blackorby, C., Bossert, W., and Donaldson, D. (1997a). Birth-Date Dependent Population Ethics: Critical-Level Principles. Journal of Economic Theory, 77:260–284.
Blackorby, C., Bossert, W., and Donaldson, D. (1997b). Critical-Level Utilitarianism and the Population-Ethics Dilemma. Economics and Philosophy, 13:197–230.
Blackorby, C., Bossert, W., and Donaldson, D. (1998). Uncertainty and Critical-Level Population Principles. Journal of Population Economics, 11:1–20.
Blackorby, C. and Donaldson, D. (1988). Cash versus Kind, Self-Selection, and Efficient Transfers. American Economic Review, 78:691–700.
Blackorby, C. and Donaldson, D. (1990). A Review Article: The Case Against the Use of the Sum of Compensating Variations in Cost-Benefit Analysis. Canadian Journal of Economics, 23:471–494.
Blackorby, C. and Donaldson, D. (1991). Adult-Equivalence Scales, Interpersonal Comparisons of Weil-Being, and Applied Welfare Economics. In Elster, J. and Roemer, J. E., editors, Interpersonal Comparisons of Well-Being, chapter 6, pages 164–199. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge.
Blackorby, C. and Donaldson, D. (1993a). Adult-Equivalence Scales and the Economic Implementation of Interpersonal Comparisons of Well-Being. Social Choice and Welfare, 10:335–361.
Blackorby, C. and Donaldson, D. (1993b). Household Equivalence Scales and Welfare Comparisons: A Comment. Journal of Public Economics, 50:143–146.
Blackorby, C., Donaldson, D., and Weymark, J. (1984). Social Choice with Interpersonal Utility Comparisons: A Diagrammatic Introduction. International Economic Review, 25:327–356.
Blackorby, C., Donaldson, D., and Weymark, J. (1990). A Welfaristic Proof of Arrow’s Theorem. Recherches Economiques de Louvain, 56:259–286.
Blaug, M. (1992). The Methodology of Economics. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge.
Border, K. C. (1985). More on Harsanyi’s Utilitarian Cardinal Welfare Theorem. Social Choice and Welfare, 1:279–281.
Bordes, G., Hammond, P. J., and Le Breton, M. (1997). Social Welfare Functionals on Restricted Domains and in Economic Environments. Stanford University, Department of Economics Working Paper No. 97-023. Available at http://www-econ.Stanford.edu/facuity/workp/index.html.
Bossert, W. (1991). On Intra-and Interpersonal Utility Comparisons. Social Choice and Welfare, 8:207–219.
Broome, J. (1990). Bolker-Jeffrey Expected Utility Theory and Axiomatic Utilitarianism. Review of Economic Studies, 57:477–502.
Broome, J. (1991a). Weighing Goods: Equality, Uncertainty and Time. Basil Blackwell, Oxford.
Broome, J. (1991b). Utilitarian Metaphysics? In Elster, J. and Roemer, J. E., editors, Interpersonal Comparisons of Well-Being, chapter 3, pages 70–97. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge.
Broome, J. (1993). A Cause of Preference is not an Object of Preference. Social Choice and Welfare, 10:57–68.
Broome, J. (1998). Extended Preferences. In Fehige, C. and Wessels, U., editors, Preferences, pages 271–287. W. de Gruyter, Berlin. Reprinted as chapter 3 of J. Broome (1999), Ethics Out of Economics, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge.
Chipman, J. S. (1987). Compensation Tests. In Eatwell, J., Milgate, M., and Newman, P., editors, The New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics. Macmillan, London.
Chipman, J. S. and Moore, J. C. (1978). The New Welfare Economics, 1939–1974. International Economic Review, 19:547–584.
Christensen, L. R., Jorgenson, D. W., and Lau, L. J. (1975). Transcendental Logarithmic Utility Functions. American Economic Review, 65:367–383. Reprinted as chapter 1 of Jorgenson (1997a).
Clark, A. and Oswald, A. J. (1994). Unhappiness and Unemployment. Economic Journal, 104:648–659.
Clark, A. and Oswald, A. J. (2002). A Simple Statistical Method for Measuring How Life Events Affect Happiness. International Journal of Epidemiology, 31:1139–1144.
Cohen, G. A. (1989). On the Currency of Equal Justice. Ethics, 99:906–944.
Cohen, G. A. (1993). Equality of What? On Welfare, Goods, and Capabilities. In Nussbaum, M. C. and Sen, A. K., editors, The Quality of Life, pages 9–29. Clarendon Press, Oxford.
Cooter, R. and Rappoport, P. (1984). Were the Ordinalists Wrong about Welfare Economics? Journal of Economic Literature, 22:507–530.
Cooter, R. and Rappoport, P. (1985). Reply to I.M.D. Little’s Comment. Journal of Economic Literature, 23:1189–1191.
Coughlin, P. J. (1986). Rights and the Private Pareto Principle. Economica, 53:303–320.
Coulhon, T. and Mongin, P. (1989). Social Choice Theory in the Case of Von Neumann-Morgenstern Utilities. Social Choice and Welfare, 6:175–187.
Dasgupta, P. (1993). An Enquiry into Weil-Being and Destitution. Clarendon Press, Oxford.
d’Aspremont, C. (1985). Axioms for Social Welfare Orderings. In Hurwicz, L., Schmeidler, D., and Sonnenschein, H., editors, Social Goals and Social Organization, chapter 2, pages 19-76. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge.
d’Aspremont, C. and Gevers, L. (1977). Equity and the Informational Basis of Collective Choice. Review of Economic Studies, 44:199–209.
Davis, J. B. (1990). Cooter and Rappoport on the Normative. Economics and Philosophy, 6:139–146.
Davis, J. B. (1991). Interpretation of Interpersonal Utility Comparisons—Positive, Normative or Descriptive? Journal of Income Distribution, 1:73–90.
De Meyer, B. and Mongin, P. (1995). A Note on Affine Aggregation. Economics Letters, 47:177–183.
Deaton, A. (1975). Models and Projections of Demand in Post-War Britain. Chapman and Hall, London.
Deaton, A. and Muellbauer, J. (1980a). Economics and Consumer Behavior. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge.
Deaton, A. and Muellbauer, J. (1980b). An Almost Ideal Demand System. American Economic Review, 70:312–326.
DeMeyer, F. and Plott, C. R. (1970). The Probability of a Cyclical Majority. Econometrica, 38:345–354.
Dhillon, A. and Mertens, J. F. (1999). Relative Utilitarianism. Econometrica, 67:471–498.
Di Telia, R., MacCulloch, R. J., and Oswald, A. J. (2001). Preferences over Inflation and Unemployment: Evidence from Surveys of Happiness. American Economic Review, 91:335–341.
Diamond, P. A. (1967). Cardinal Welfare, Individualistic Ethics, and Interpersonal Comparisons of Utility: Comment. Journal of Political Economy, 75:765–766.
Diamond, P. A. and Mirrlees, J. A. (1971). Optimal Taxation and Public Production I: Production Efficiency and II: Tax Rules. American Economic Review, 61:8–27 and 261-278.
Dixit, A. and Norman, V. (1980). Theory of International Trade. James Nisbet, Welwyn, Herts.
Dixit, A. and Norman, V. (1986). Gains from Trade without Lump-Sum Compensation. Journal of International Economics, 21:99–110.
Dworkin, R. (1981). What is Equality? Part 2: Equality of resources. Philosophy & Public Affairs, 10:283–345.
Dworkin, R. (2000). Sovereign Virtue. The Theory and Practice of Equality. Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Mass.
Easterlin, R. (1974). Does Economic Growth Improve the Human Lot? Some Empirical Evidence. In David, P. A. and Reder, M. W., editors, Nations and Households in Economic Growth: Essays in Honour of Moses Abramowitz. Academic Press, New York.
Easterlin, R. (1995). Will Raising the Income of All Increase the Happiness of All? Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, 27:35–48.
Ebert, U. (1997). Social Welfare When Needs Differ. Economica, 64:233–244.
Fishburn, P. C. (1970). Utility Theory for Decision Making. John Wiley, New York.
Fleurbaey, M. (1995). Equal Opportunity or Equal Social Outcome? Economics and Philosophy, 11:25–55.
Fleurbaey, M. and Maniquet, F. (forthcoming). Utilitarianism versus Fairness in Welfare Economics. In Salles, M. and Weymark, J. A., editors, Justice, Political Liberalism and Utilitarianism: Themes from Harsanyi and Rawls. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge.
Foley, D. K. (1970). Lindahl’s Solution and the Core of an Economy with Public Goods. Econometrica, 38:66–72.
Frank, R. H. (1997). The Frame of Reference as a Public Good. Economic Journal, 107:1832–1847.
Geary, R. C. (1949–50). A Note on ‘A Constant Utility Index of the Cost of Living’. Review of Economic Studies, 18:65–66.
Gehrlein, W. V. (1997). Condorcet’s Paradox and the Condorcet Efficiency of Voting Rules. Mathematica Japonica, 45:173–199.
Gehrlein, W. V. and Fishburn, P. C. (1976). Condorcet’s Paradox and Anonymous Preference Profiles. Public Choice, 26:1–18.
Gevers, L. (1986). Walrasian Social Choice: Some Simple Axiomatic Approaches. In Heller, W. P., Starr, R. M., and Starrett, D. A., editors, Social Choice and Public Decision Making: Essays in Honor of Kenneth J. Arrow. Vol. 1. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge.
Glewwe, U. (1997). Household Equivalence Scales and the Measurement of Inequality: Transfers from the Poor to the Rich Could Decrease Inequality. Journal of Public Economics, 44:211–216.
Goodin, R. (1986). Laundering Preferences. In Elster, J. and Hylland, A., editors, Foundations of social choice theory, chapter 3, pages 75–102. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge.
Gorman, W. M. (1953). Community Preference Fields. Econometrica, 21:63–80.
Gorman, W. M. (1961). On a Class of Preference Fields. Metroeconomica, 13:53–56. Reprinted in C. Blackorby and A.F. Shorrocks (eds.) (1995), Separability and Aggregation: Collected Works of W.M. Gorman, Volume 1, Clarendon Press, Oxford.
Gorman, W. M. (1976). Tricks with Utility Functions. In Artis, M. J. and Nobay, A. R., editors, Essays in Economic Analysis. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge.
Guesnerie, R. (1995). A Contribution to the Pure Theory of Taxation. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge.
Hammond, P. J. (1975). A Note on Extreme Inequality Aversion. Journal of Economic Theory, 11:465–467.
Hammond, P. J. (1976). Equity, Arrow’s Conditions, and Rawls’ Difference Principle. Econometrica, 44:793–804.
Hammond, P. J. (1977a). Dynamic Restrictions on Metastatic Choice. Economica, 44:337–350.
Hammond, P. J. (1977b). Dual Interpersonal Comparisons of Utility and the Welfare Economics of Income Distribution. Journal of Public Economics, 7:51–71.
Hammond, P. J. (1979). Equity in Two Person Situations: Some Consequences. Econometrica, 47:1127–1135.
Hammond, P. J. (1980). Dual Interpersonal Comparisons of Utility and the Welfare Economics of Income Distribution: A Corrigendum. Journal of Public Economics, 14:105–106.
Hammond, P. J. (1982). Liberalism, Independent Rights and the Pareto Principle. In Cohen, L. J., Łoś, J., Pfeiffer, H., and Podewski, K.-P., editors, Logic, Methodology and the Philosophy of Science, VI, pages 607–620. North-Holland, Amsterdam.
Hammond, P. J. (1987a). Social Choice: the Science of the Impossible? In Feiwel, G. R., editor, Arrow and the Foundations of the Theory of Economic Policy, chapter IB, pages 116–134. New York University Press, New York.
Hammond, P. J. (1987b). On Reconciling Arrow’s Theory of Social Choice With Harsanyi’s Fundamental Utilitarianism. In Feiwel, G. R., editor, Arrow and the Foundations of the Theory of Economic Policy, chapter 4, pages 179–222. New York University Press, New York.
Hammond, P. J. (1988). Consequentialist Demographic Norms and Parenting Rights. Social Choice and Welfare, 5:127–145.
Hammond, P. J. (1990). Theoretical Progress in Public Economics: A Provocative Assessment. Oxford Economic Papers, 42:6–33. Also in P.J.N. Sinclair and M.D.E. Slater (eds.) (1991), Taxation, Private Information and Capital, Clarendon Press, Oxford.
Hammond, P. J. (1991a). Interpersonal Comparisons of Utility: Why and How They Are and Should Be Made. In Elster, J. and Roemer, J. E., editors, Interpersonal Comparisons of Well-Being, chapter 7, pages 200–254. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge.
Hammond, P. J. (1991b). Independence of Irrelevant Interpersonal Comparisons. Social Choice and Welfare, 8:1–19.
Hammond, P. J. (1992). Harsanyi’s Utilitarian Theorem: A Simpler Proof and Some Ethical Connotations. In Selten, R., editor, Rational Interaction: Essays in Honor of John Harsanyi, pages 305–319. Springer-Verlag, Berlin.
Hammond, P. J. (1994). Money Metric Measures of Individual and Social Welfare Allowing for Environmental Externalities. In Eichhorn, W., editor, Models and Measurement of Welfare and Inequality, pages 694–724. Springer-Verlag, Berlin.
Hammond, P. J. (1995). Social Choice of Individual and Group Rights. In Barnett, W. A., Moulin, H., Salles, M., and Schofield, N., editors, Social Choice, Welfare, and Ethics, chapter 3, pages 55–77. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge.
Hammond, P. J. (1996). Consequentialist Decision Theory and Utilitarian Ethics. In Farina, F., Hahn, F., and Vannucci, S., editors, Ethics, Rationality, and Economic Behaviour, pages 92–118. Clarendon Press, Oxford.
Hammond, P. J. (1999). Multilaterally Strategy-Proof Mechanisms in Random Aumann-Hildenbrand Macroeconomies. In Wooders, M., editor, Topics in Game Theory and Mathematical Economics: Essays in Honor of Robert J. Aumann, pages 171–187. American Mathematical Society, Providence, RI.
Hammond, P. J. (2000). Reassessing the Diamond/Mirrlees Efficiency Theorem. In Hammond, P. J. and Myles, G. D., editors, Incentives, Organization, and Public Economics: Papers in Honour of Sir James Mirrlees, chapter 12, pages 193-216. Oxford University Press.
Hammond, P. J. and Sempere, J. (1995). Limits to the Potential Gains from Economic Integration and Other Supply Side Policies. Economic Journal, 105:1180–1204.
Harberger, A. C. (1971). Three Basic Postulates for Applied Welfare Analysis. Journal of Economic Literature, 9:785–797.
Harberger, A. C. (1978). On the Use of Distributional Weights in Social Cost Benefit Analysis. Journal of Political Economy, 86:S87–S120.
Harsanyi, J. C. (1955). Cardinal Welfare, Individualistic Ethics, and Interpersonal Comparisons of Utility. Journal of Political Economy, 63:309–321. Reprinted in Phelps (1973) and Harsanyi (1976).
Harsanyi, J. C. (1976). Essays on Ethics, Social Behavior, and Scientific Explanation. D. Reidel, Dordrecht.
Harsanyi, J. C. (1982). Morality and the Theory of Rational Behaviour. In Sen, A. K. and Williams, B., editors, Utilitarianism and Beyond, chapter 2, pages 39–62. Cambridge University Press and Editions de la MSH, Cambridge and Paris.
Harsanyi, J. C. (1987). Interpersonal Utility Comparison. In Eatwell, J., Milgate, M., and Newman, P., editors, The New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics. Macmillan, London.
Hennipman, P. (1988). A New Look at the Ordinalist Revolution: Comments on Cooter and Rappoport. Journal of Economic Literature, 26:89–91.
Hennipman, P. (1992). Hicks, Robbins, and the Demise of Pigovian Welfare Economics: Rectification and Amplification. Southern Economic Journal, 59:88–97.
Hicks, J. R. (1959). Essays in World Economics. Clarendon Press, Oxford.
Hicks, J. R. (1981). Wealth and Welfare: Collected Essays on Economic Theory. Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Mass.
Isbell, J. R. (1959). Absolute Games. In Tucker, A. W. and Luce, R. D., editors, Contributions to the Theory of Games, pages 357–396. Princeton University Press, Princeton.
Jorgenson, D. W. (1990). Aggregate Consumer Behavior and the Measurement of Social Welfare. Econometrica, 58:1007–1040. Reprinted as chapter 1 of Jorgenson (1997b).
Jorgenson, D. W. (1997a). Welfare Volume 1: Aggregate Consumer Behavior. MIT Press, Cambridge, Mass.
Jorgenson, D. W. (1997b). Welfare Volume 2: Measuring Social Welfare. MIT Press, Cambridge, Mass.
Jorgenson, D. W., Lau, L. J., and Stoker, T. M. (1982). The Transcendental Logarithmic Model of Aggregate Consumer behavior. In Basmann, R. L. and Rhodes, G., editors, Advances in Econometrics, Vol. 1, pages 97–238. JAI Press, Greenwich, Conn. Reprinted as chapter 8 of Jorgenson (1997a).
Jorgenson, D. W. and Slesnick, D. T. (1983). Individual and Social Cost-of-Living Indices. In Diewert, W. E. and Mont marquette, C., editors, Price Level Measurement, pages 241–323. Statistics Canada, Ottawa. Reprinted as chapter 2 of Jorgenson (1997b).
Jorgenson, D. W. and Slesnick, D. T. (1987). Aggregate Consumer Behavior and Household Equivalence Scales. Journal of Business and Economic Statistics, 5:219–232. Reprinted as chapter 5 of Jorgenson (1997b).
Kahneman, D., Wakker, P. P., and Sarin, R. (1997). Back to Bentham? Explorations of Experienced Utility. Quarterly Journal of Economics, 112:375–406.
Kaldor, N. (1939). Welfare Propositions of Economics and Interpersonal Comparisons of Utility. Economic Journal, 49:549–552.
Kaneko, M. (1984). On Interpersonal Utility Comparisons. Social Choice and Welfare, 1:165–175.
Kaneko, M. and Nakamura, K. (1979). The Nash Social Welfare function. Econometrica, 47:423–435.
Kemp, M. and Ng, Y. K. (1987). Arrow’s Independence Condition and the Bergson-Samuelson Tradition. In Feiwel, G. R., editor, Arrow and the Foundations of the Theory of Economic Policy, chapter 5, pages 223–242. New York University Press, New York.
Klein, L. R. and Rubin, H. (1947–48). A Constant Utility Index of the Cost of Living. Review of Economic Studies, 15:84–87.
Kolm, S.-C. (1968). The Optimal Production of Social Justice. In Margolis, J. and Guitton, H., editors, Public Economics: An Analysis of Public Production and Consumption and their Relations to the Private Sector, pages 145–200. Macmillan, London.
Kolm, S.-C. (1972). Justice et équité. Editions du CNRS, Paris. Translated as Justice and Equity (1998), MIT Press, Cambridge, Mass.
Kolm, S.-C. (1994). The Meaning of Fundamental Preferences. Social Choice and Welfare, 11:193–198.
Kolm, S.-C. (1995). The Economics of Social Sentiments: The Case of Envy. Japanese Economic Review, 46:63–87.
Kolm, S.-C. (1996). Modern Theories of Justice. Mass: MIT Press, Cambridge.
Lau, L. J. (1982). A Note on the Fundamental Theorem of Exact Aggregation. Economics Letters, 9:119–126.
Lewbel, A. (1989). Household Equivalence Scales and Welfare Comparisons. Journal of Public Economics, 39:377–391.
Lewbel, A. (1991). Cost of Characteristics Indices and Household Equivalence Scales. European Economic Review, 35:1277–1293.
Lewbel, A. (1993). Household Equivalence Scales and Welfare Comparisons: Reply. Journal of Public Economics, 50:147–148.
Little, I. M. D. (1957). A Critique of Welfare Economics. Oxford University Press, Oxford.
May, K. O. (1952). A Set of Independent Necessary and Sufficient Conditions for Simple Majority Decisions. Econometrica, 20:680–684.
May, K. O. (1985). Robert Cooter and Peter Rappoport, ‘Were the Ordinalists Wrong about Welfare Economics?’: A Comment. Journal of Economic Literature, 23:1186–1188.
Mayston, D. J. (1974). The Idea of Social Choice. Macmillan, London.
Mayston, D. J. (1980). Where Did Prescriptive Welfare Economics Go Wrong? In Currie, D. A. and Peters, W., editors, Contemporary Economic Analysis, Vol. 2, chapter 7, pages 175–216. Croom-Helm, London.
McGarvey, D. (1953). A Theorem on the Construction of Voting Paradoxes. Econometrica, 21:608–610.
McKelvey, R. D. (1976). Intransitivities in Multidimensional Voting Models and Some Implications for Agenda Control. Journal of Economic Theory, 12:472–482.
Milleron, J. C. (1972). Theory of Value with Public Goods: A Survey Article. Journal of Economic Theory, 5:419–477.
Mirrlees, J. A. (1971). An Exploration in the Theory of Optimum Income Taxation. Review of Economic Studies, 38:175–208.
Mirrlees, J. A. (1982). The Economic Uses of Utilitarianism. In Sen, A. K. and Williams, B., editors, Utilitarianism and Beyond, chapter 3, pages 63–84. Cambridge University Press and Editions de la Maison des Sciences de l’Homme, Cambridge and Paris.
Mongin, P. and d’Aspremont, C. (1998). Utility Theory and Ethics. In Barberà, S., Hammond, P. J., and Seidl, C., editors, Handbook of Utility Theory, Vol. I, chapter 10, pages 371–482. Kluwer, Dordrecht.
Moulin, H. and Thomson, W. (1996). Axiomatic Analysis of Resource Allocation Problems. In Arrow, K. J., Sen, A. K., and Suzumura, K., editors, Social Choice Re-Examined, Vol. 1, chapter 5, pages 101–120. Macmillan, London. IEA Conference Volume, no. 117.
Myers, D. G. (1993). The Pursuit of Happiness: Who is Happy and Why? Avon, New York.
Myerson, R. (1985). Bayesian Equilibrium and Incentive Compatibility: An Introduction. In Hurwicz, L. and Schmeidler, D., editors, Social Goals and Social Organization, chapter 8, pages 229–259. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge.
Nagahisa, R. and Suga, K. (1998). Impossibility Theorems with Interpersonally Comparable Welfare Levels: The ‘Extended Sympathy’ Approach Reconsidered. Japanese Economic Review, 49:171–190.
Narens, L. and Luce, R. D. (1983). How We May Have Been Misled into Believing in the Interpersonal Comparability of Utility. Theory and Decision, 15:247–260.
Nash, J. F. (1950). The Bargaining Problem. Econometrica, 18:155–162.
Ng, Y. K. (1996). Happiness Surveys: Some Comparability Issues and an Exploratory Survey Based on Just Perceivable Increments. Social Indicators Research, 38:1–27.
Nussbaum, M. C. (1993). Non-Relative Virtues: An Aristotelian Approach. In Nussbaum, M. C. and Sen, A. K., editors, The Quality of Life, pages 242–269. Clarendon Press, Oxford.
Oswald, A. J. (1997). Happiness and Economic Performance. Economic Journal, 107:1815–1831.
Parfit, D. (1987). Reasons and Persons. Oxford University Press, Oxford.
Pazner, E. (1979). Equity, Nonfeasible Alternatives and Social Choice: A Reconsideration of the Concept of Social Welfare. In Laffont, J. J., editor, Aggregation and Revelation of Preferences. North-Holland, Amsterdam.
Pazner, E. and Schmeidler, D. (1978). Egalitarian Equivalent Allocations: A New Concept of Economic Equity. Quarterly Journal of Economics, 92:671–687.
Peters, H. J. M. (1992). Axiomatic Bargaining Game Theory. Kluwer, Dordrecht.
Phelps, E. S. (1973). Economic Justice. Penguin Books, Harmondsworth.
Plott, C. R. (1973). Path Independence, Rationality, and Social Choice. Econometrica, 41:1075–1091.
Pratt, J. W. (1964). Risk Aversion in the Small and in the Large. Econometrica, 32:122–136.
Rawls, J. (1971). A Theory of Justice. Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Mass.
Robbins, L. (1932). An Essay on the Nature and Significance of Economic Science. Macmillan, London.
Robbins, L. (1938). Interpersonal Comparisons of Utility: A Comment. Economic Journal, 48:635–641.
Robbins, L. (1981). Economics and Political Economy. American Economic Review, Papers and Proceedings, 71:1–10.
Roberts, K. W. S. (1980a). Possibility Theorems with Interpersonally Comparable Welfare Levels. Review of Economic Studies, 47:409–420.
Roberts, K. W. S. (1980b). Interpersonal Comparability and Social Choice Theory. Review of Economic Studies, 47:421–439.
Roberts, K. W. S. (1995). Valued Opinions or Opinionated Values: The Double Aggregation Problem. In Basu, K., Pattanaik, P. K., and Suzumura, K., editors, Choice, Welfare and Development: A Festschrift in Honour of Amartya K. Sen, chapter 8, pages 141–165. Oxford University Press, Oxford.
Roberts, K. W. S. (1996). Interpersonal Comparisons of the Extended Sympathy Type and the Possibility of Social Choice: Discussion. In Arrow, K. J., Sen, A. K., and Suzumura, K., editors, Social Choice Re-examined, Vol. 2, pages 230–236. Macmillan, London. IEA Conference Volume, no. 117.
Roberts, K. W. S. (1997). Objective Interpersonal Comparisons of Utility. Social Choice and Welfare, 14:79–96.
Roemer, J. E. (1993). A Pragmatic Theory of Responsibility for the Egalitarian Planner. Philosophy and Public Affairs, 22:146–166.
Roemer, J. E. (1998). Equality of Opportunity. Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Mass.
Rosenbaum, E. F. (1995). Interpersonal Comparisons of Utility: Positive, Normative or Value-Laden? Journal of Economic Methodology, 2:239–257.
Roth, A. E. (1979). Axiomatic Models of Bargaining. Springer Verlag, Berlin.
Samuelson, P. A. (1947). Foundations of Economic Analysis. Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Mass.
Samuelson, P. A. (1947–48). Some Implications of Linearity. Review of Economic Studies, 15:88–90.
Samuelson, P. A. (1956). Social Indifference Curves. Quarterly Journal of Economics, 70:1–22.
Samuelson, P. A. (1977). Reaffirming the Existence of ‘Reasonable’ Bergson-Samuelson Social Welfare Functions. Economica, 44:81–88.
Samuelson, P. A. (1987). Sparks from Arrow’s Anvil. In Feiwel, G. R., editor, Arrow and the Foundations of the Theory of Economic Policy, chapter 3, pages 154–178. New York University Press, New York.
Schick, F. (1971). Beyond Utilitarianism. Journal of Philosophy, 68:657–666.
Schüssler, R. (1998). Wish You Were Me: A Reply to Broome and a Comment on Harsanyi’s Extended Preference Theory. In Fehige, C. and Wessel, U., editors, Preferences, pages 288–297. W. de Gruyter, Berlin.
Scitovsky, T. (1941). A Note on Welfare Propositions in Economics. Review of Economic Studies, 9:77–88.
Sen, A. K. (1970a). Collective Choice and Social Welfare. Holden-Day, San Francisco.
Sen, A. K. (1970b). The Impossibility of a Paretian Liberal. Journal of Political Economy, 78:152–157.
Sen, A. K. (1973). On Economic Inequality. Clarendon Press, Oxford.
Sen, A. K. (1977). On Weights and Measures: Informational Constraints in Social Welfare Analysis. Econometrica, 45:1539–1572.
Sen, A. K. (1979). Personal Utilities and Public Judgements: or What’s Wrong with Welfare Economics? Economic Journal, 89:537–558.
Sen, A. K. (1980). Equality of What? In McMurrin, S. M., editor, The Tanner Lectures on Human Values, Vol. I. The University of Utah Press and Cambridge University Press, Salt Lake City and Cambridge.
Sen, A. K. (1985). Commodities and Capabilities. North-Holland, Amsterdam.
Sen, A. K. (1986). Social Choice Theory. In Arrow, K. J. and Intriligator, M. D., editors, Handbook of Mathematical Economics, Vol. III, chapter 22, pages 1073–1181. North-Holland, Amsterdam.
Sen, A. K. (1987). On Ethics and Economics. Clarendon Press, Oxford.
Sen, A. K. (1992). Inequality Reexamined. Clarendon Press, Oxford.
Shorrocks, A. F. (1995). Inequality and Welfare Evaluation of Heterogeneous Income Distributions. Discussion Paper 447, University of Essex.
Simmons, P. J. (1980). Discussion. In Currie, D. A. and Peters, W., editors, Contemporary Economic Analysis, Vol. 2, pages 217–220. Croom-Helm, London.
Simon, J. A. (1974). Interpersonal Welfare Comparisons Can be Made — and Used for Redistribution Decisions. Kyklos, 27:63–98.
Slesnick, D. T. (2001). Consumption and Social Welfare: Living Standards and Their Distribution in the United States. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge.
Stone, J. R. N. (1954). Linear Expenditure Systems and Demand Analysis: An Application to the Pattern of British Demand. Economic Journal, 64:511–527.
Strasnick, S. (1977). Ordinality and the Spirit of the Justified Dictator. Social Research, 44:668–690.
Sumner, L. W. (1996). Welfare, Happiness and Ethics. Clarendon Press, Oxford.
Suppes, P. (1966). Some Formal Models of Grading Principles. Synthese, 6:284–306.
Suzumura, K. (1983). Resolving Conflicting Views of Justice in Social Choice. In Pattanaik, P. K. and Salles, M., editors, Social Choice and Welfare, chapter 8, pages 125–149. North-Holland, Amsterdam.
Suzumura, K. (1996). Interpersonal Comparisons of the Extended Sympathy Type and the Possibility of Social Choice. In Arrow, K. J., Sen, A. K., and Suzumura, K., editors, Social Choice Re-Examined, Vol. 2, chapter 15, pages 202–229. Macmillan, London. IEA Conference Volume, no. 117.
Thomson, W. (1988). A Study of Choice Correspondences in Economies with a Variable Number of Agents. Journal of Economic Theory, 46:237–254.
Thomson, W. (1994). Bargaining Theory: The Axiomatic Approach. Academic Press, San Diego.
van Parijs, P. (1995). Real Freedom for All. Oxford University Press, Oxford.
Veenhoven, R. (1993). Happiness in Nations: Subjective Appreciation of Life in 56 Nations 1946–1992. Erasmus University Risbo, Rotterdam.
Vickrey, W. S. (1945). Measuring Marginal Utility by the Reactions to Risk. Econometrica, 13:319–333.
Weymark, J. A. (1984). Arrow’s Theorem with Social Quasi-Order ings. Public Choice, 42:235–246.
Weymark, J. A. (1991). A Reconsideration of the Harsanyi-Sen Debate on Utilitarianism. In Elster, J. and Roemer, J. E., editors, Interpersonal Comparisons of Well-Being, chapter 8, pages 255–320. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge.
Weymark, J. A. (1993). Harsanyi’s Social Aggregation Theorem and the Weak Pareto Principle. Social Choice and Welfare, 10:209–221.
Weymark, J. A. (1995). Further Remarks on Harsanyi’s Social Aggregation Theorem and the Weak Pareto Principle. Social Choice and Welfare, 12:87–92.
Wilson, R. B. (1972). Social Choice without the Pareto Principle. Journal of Economic Theory, 5:478–486.
Winkelmann, L. and Winkelmann, R. (1998). Why Are the Unemployed So Unhappy? Evidence from Panel Data. Economica, 65:1–15.
Young, H. P. (1974). An Axiomatization of the Borda Rule. Journal of Economic Theory, 9:43–52.
Young, H. P. (1988). Condorcet’s Theory of Voting. American Political Science Review, 82:1231–1244.
Young, H. P. (1994). Equity. In Theory and Practice. Princeton University Press, Princeton.
Young, H. P. (1995). Optimal Voting Rules. Journal of Economic Perspectives, 9:51–64.
Young, H. P. and Levenglick, A. (1978). A Consistent Extension of Condorcet’s Election Principle. SIAM Journal of Applied Mathematics, 35:285–300.
Author information
Authors and Affiliations
Editor information
Editors and Affiliations
Rights and permissions
Copyright information
© 2004 Springer Science+Business Media New York
About this chapter
Cite this chapter
Fleurbaey, M., Hammond, P.J. (2004). Interpersonally Comparable Utility. In: Barberà, S., Hammond, P.J., Seidl, C. (eds) Handbook of Utility Theory. Springer, Boston, MA. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4020-7964-1_8
Download citation
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4020-7964-1_8
Publisher Name: Springer, Boston, MA
Print ISBN: 978-1-4419-5417-6
Online ISBN: 978-1-4020-7964-1
eBook Packages: Springer Book Archive
Keywords
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.