Global Economic Justice, Partiality, and Coercion
My subject is global economic justice, the division of economic resources among human beings. Questions of non-economic justice involving rights to security, liberty of action, freedom of speech, religion, and political participation, will come into the picture now and then. But my central focus is economic justice.
principles of justice ought to transcend nationality and citizenship, and ought to apply equally to all individuals of the world as a whole…cosmopolitan justice is justice without borders.
The other view—let’s call it Liberal Nationalism—holds that the most basic principles of economic justice apply to individuals only within particular societies. Economic justice is first and foremost about the division of resources within a sovereign state. It is ‘domestic’, rather than ‘global’. Principles of global economic justice exist, but they primarily focus on relationships among states, not among individuals.
KeywordsPrima Facie Economic Inequality Relative Deprivation Economic Justice Special Obligation
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- 2.Perhaps the first use of this phrase is in Yael Tamir, Liberal Nationalism (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1993). Tan, op. cit. follows this usage. The same theory is called Social Liberalism by Charles Beitz, “Social and Cosmopolitan Liberalism”, International Affairs, v. 75, 1999: pp. 515–530. Thomas Nagel calls it the Political Conception of Global Justice in “The Problem of Global Justice”, Philosophy and Public Affairs, v. 33, 2005: p. 120. This is his name for the sort of theory put forward by John Rawls in The Law of Peoples (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1999). The Rawlsian account has recently been defended by David Reidy in “Rawls on International Justice: A Defense”, Political Theory, v. 32, 2004: pp. 291–319, and “A Just Global Economy: In defense of Rawls”, Journal of Ethics, v. 11, 2007: pp. 193–236.Google Scholar
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