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The Vulnerable Self: Enabling the Recognition of Racial Inequality

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Feminist Ethics and Social and Political Philosophy: Theorizing the Non-Ideal
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Abstract

This chapter is a descriptive account of a disposition that promotes the recognition of racial oppression. Insofar as white supremacy conditions whites to not see racial injustice, they are discouraged from recognizing white racism; as a result, disagreement on matters regarding race and racism often falls along the color line with a typical black view that accounts for racism and a typical white view that often does not. It is therefore unlikely that more evidence will convince whites of the fact of racial oppression. It seems reasonable, then, to turn to the self and reveal what character disposition enables the recognition of racial oppression despite conditioning. I propose that selves who are dispositionally vulnerable are able to recognize racial inequality. Dispositional vulnerability is an awareness of self dependence on others for understanding and respect, and an awareness, in turn, of the other’s dependence for understanding and respect. Whether dispositional vulnerability is cultivated or conditioned, it promotes understanding across group differences like privilege and subordination and contributes to an atmosphere in which people feel compelled to understand and cooperate with one another.

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Acknowledgments

For giving me the opportunity to share my ideas and for reading and offering insightful comments on countless drafts of this essay, I give my heartfelt thanks to Lisa Tessman. I would also like to thank the audience members at the November 2006 meeting of the Radical Philosophy Association for their comments on a related paper that I presented (a special thanks to Richard Schmitt for steering me away from Buber). Your comments helped me think through some of the key ideas in this essay.

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Correspondence to Desirée H. Melton .

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Melton, D.H. (2009). The Vulnerable Self: Enabling the Recognition of Racial Inequality. In: Tessman, L. (eds) Feminist Ethics and Social and Political Philosophy: Theorizing the Non-Ideal. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4020-6841-6_9

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