The Social Embedding of Intelligence
I claim that to pass the Turing Test over any period of extended time, it will be necessary to embed the entity into society. This chapter discusses why this is, and how it might be brought about. I start by arguing that intelligence is better characterized by tests of social interaction, especially in open-ended and extended situations. I then argue that learning is an essential component of intelligence and hence that a universal intelligence is impossible. These two arguments support the relevance of the Turing Test as a particular, but appropriate test of interactive intelligence. I look to the human case to argue that individual intelligence uses society to a considerable extent for its development. Taking a lead from the human case, I outline how a socially embedded Artificial Intelligence might be brought about in terms of four aspects: free will, emotion, empathy, and self-modeling. In each case, I try to specify what social ‘hooks’ might be required for the full ability to develop during a considerable period of in situ acculturation. The chapter ends by speculating what it might be like to live with the result.
KeywordsIntelligence social embedding interaction free will empathy self emotion Turing Test learning design acculturation
Unable to display preview. Download preview PDF.
- Aydede, M., 1999, Language of thought hypothesis: state of the art, in: Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy; http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/language-thought/.
- Aydede, M. and Güzeldere, G., 2002, Consciousness, intentionality, and intelligence: some foundational issues for artificial intelligence; http://web.clas.ufl.edu/users/maydede/introspection.htm.
- Baum, E., 1998, Manifesto for an Evolutionary Economics of Intelligence, in: B., Neural Networks and Machine Learning, Springer, pp. 285–344.Google Scholar
- Bridgeman, B., 1992, On the evolution of consciousness and language, Pscoloquy3; http://www.cogsci.soton.ac.uk/cgi/psyc/newpsy?3.15.
- Burns, T. R. and Engdahl, E., 1998, The social construction of consciousness part 2: individual selves, self-awareness, and reflectivity, Journal of Consciousness Studies 2: 166–184.Google Scholar
- Byrne, R. W. and Whiten, A., 1988, Machiavellian Intelligence: Social Expertise and the Evolution of Intellect in Monkeys, Apes and Humans, Clarendon Press, Oxford University Press, Oxford.Google Scholar
- Byrne, R. W. and Whiten, A., 1997, Machiavellian Intelligence II: Extensions and Evaluations, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge.Google Scholar
- Dennett, D. C., 1984, Elbow Room: The Varieties of Free Will Worth Wanting, Oxford University Press, Oxford.Google Scholar
- Dennett, D. C., 1989, The origin of selves, Cogito 3(163–173).Google Scholar
- Edmonds, B., 1999b, Gossip, sexual recombination and the el farol bar: modelling the emergence of heterogeneity, Journal of Artificial Societies and Social Simulation 2(3).Google Scholar
- Edmonds, B., 2001 Meta-genetic programming: co-evolving the operators of variation, Elektrik 9(1): 13–29.Google Scholar
- Ernst, G. and Newell, A., 1969, GPS: A Case Study in Generality and Problem Solving, Academic Press, New York.Google Scholar
- Hoffman, J., 1993, Vorhersage und Erkenntnis [Anticipation and Cognition], Hogrefe, Goettingen, Germany.Google Scholar
- Hofstadter, D. R., 1985, Analogies and roles in human and machine thinking, in: Metamagical Themas: Questing for the Essence of Mind and Pattern, Penguin, London.Google Scholar
- Holland, J. H., 1992, Adaptation in Natural and Artificial Systems, MIT Press, Cambridge, MA.Google Scholar
- Jannink, J., 1994, Cracking and co-evolving randomlist, in: Advances in Genetic Programming, K. E. Kinnear, ed., MIT Press, Cambridge, MA.Google Scholar
- Koza, J. R., 1994, Genetic Programming II: Automatic Discovery of Reusable Subprograms, MIT Press, Cambridge, MA.Google Scholar
- Kummer, H., Daston, L., Gigerenzer, G., and Silk, J., 1997, The social intelligence hypothesis, in: Human by Nature: Between Biology and the Social Sciences, Weingart et al., eds., Lawrence Erlbaum, Hillsdale, NJ, pp. 157–179.Google Scholar
- Minsky, M., 2002, The emotion machine; http://web.media.mit.edu/˜minsky/
- Perlis, D., 1997, Consciousness as self-function, Journal of Consciousness Studies 4: 509–525.Google Scholar
- Sloman, A., 2002, How many separately evolved emotional beasties live within us?, in: P. S. Emotions in Humans and Artifacts, MIT Press, Cambridge, MA.Google Scholar
- Stolzmann, W., 1998, Anticipatory Classifier Systems, Genetic Programming, University of Wisconsin, Morgan Kaufmann, Madison, WI, pp. 658–664.Google Scholar
- Tolman, E. C., 1932, Purposive Behavior in Animals and Men, Appleton, New York.Google Scholar
- Weizenbaum, J., 1976, Computer Power and Human Reason: From Judgement to Calculation, W. H. Freeman, San Francisco, CAGoogle Scholar
- Wolpert, D. H. and Macready, W. G., 1995, No free lunch theorems for search, Santa Fe Institute Technical Report SFI-TR-95–02–010.Google Scholar