The Social Embedding of Intelligence

Towards Producing a Machine that Could Pass the Turing Test
  • Bruce Edmonds


I claim that to pass the Turing Test over any period of extended time, it will be necessary to embed the entity into society. This chapter discusses why this is, and how it might be brought about. I start by arguing that intelligence is better characterized by tests of social interaction, especially in open-ended and extended situations. I then argue that learning is an essential component of intelligence and hence that a universal intelligence is impossible. These two arguments support the relevance of the Turing Test as a particular, but appropriate test of interactive intelligence. I look to the human case to argue that individual intelligence uses society to a considerable extent for its development. Taking a lead from the human case, I outline how a socially embedded Artificial Intelligence might be brought about in terms of four aspects: free will, emotion, empathy, and self-modeling. In each case, I try to specify what social ‘hooks’ might be required for the full ability to develop during a considerable period of in situ acculturation. The chapter ends by speculating what it might be like to live with the result.


Intelligence social embedding interaction free will empathy self emotion Turing Test learning design acculturation 


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Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media B.V. 2009

Authors and Affiliations

  • Bruce Edmonds
    • 1
  1. 1.Centre for Policy ModellingManchester Metropolitan UniversityManchesterUSA

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