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Incommensurability Naturalized

  • Alexander Bird
Part of the Boston Studies in the Philosophy of Science book series (BSPS, volume 255)

Abstract

In this paper I argue that we can understand incommensurability in a naturalistic, psychological manner. Cognitive habits can be acquired and so differ between individuals. Drawing on psychological work concerning analogical thinking and thinking with schemata, I argue that incommensurability arises between individuals with different cognitive habits and between groups with different shared cognitive habits.

Keywords

Kuhn incommensurability world change paradigm exemplar cognitive psychology analogy schema model 

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Copyright information

© Springer 2008

Authors and Affiliations

  • Alexander Bird
    • 1
  1. 1.University of BristolUK

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