Abstract
This paper discusses when selfish agents begin to cooperate instead of defect, taking a specific task of maintenance of themselves. The network cleaning problem where a collection of agents capable of repairing other agents by overwriting its content can clean the collection will be discussed. With this problem, cooperate corresponds to repairing other agents and defect to not repair. Although both defect is a Nash equilibrium: no agent is willing to repair others when only the repair cost is involved in the payoff, agents may cooperate with each other when system reliability is also incorporated in the payoff and with certain conditions satisfied. Incentive for cooperation will be stronger when further system wide criterion such as availability is involved in the payoff.
Keywords
- Nash Equilibrium
- Task Allocation
- Combinatorial Auction
- Repair Cost
- Game Theoretic Approach
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Ishida, Y. (2007). A Game Theoretic Analysis on Incentive for Cooperation in a Self-Repairing Network. In: Sobh, T. (eds) Innovations and Advanced Techniques in Computer and Information Sciences and Engineering. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4020-6268-1_89
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4020-6268-1_89
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