Rawlsian Intergenerational Justice as a Markov-perfect Equilibrium in a Resource Technology

Part of the Sustainability, Economics, and Natural Resources book series (SENR, volume 3)

The Rawlsian maximin criterion is combined with nonpaternalistic altruistic preferences in a nonrenewable resource technology. The maximin programme is shown to be time-inconsistent for a subset of initial conditions. A solution to this intergenerational conflict is found, under a given assumption, as a generically unique subgame-perfect equilibrium.

Keywords

Expense Nash Rium Myopia Alloca 

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