John Searle’s The Construction of Social Reality (1995) offers an account of the nature of social reality that complements and builds on the views of language and mind that Searle has developed in his earlier books (Searle 1969, 1983, 1992). It shares with those books a combination of a high level of both philosophical rigor and accessibility, and takes the reader down a persuasive path from the basic questions “What is social reality?” and “What are institutional facts?” to Searle’s detailed answer to these questions.
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Wilson, R.A. (2007). Social Reality and Institutional Facts: Sociality Within and Without Intentionality. In: Tsohatzidis, S.L. (eds) Intentional Acts and Institutional Facts. Theory and Decision Library, vol 41. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4020-6104-2_6
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