Abstract
This paper argues that agents’ intentions can play a critical role in the moral appraisal of policies that result in the creation of shorter or harder lives than the lives that would have resulted from other policies. When agents, whether parents or policymakers, intend to create people whom they believe can only lead shorter or harder lives than others they might have created, the people they create will lack a complaint against them—a complaint they might have had if the agents lacked those intentions.
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Wasserman, D.T. (2009). Harms to Future People and Procreative Intentions. In: Roberts, M.A., Wasserman, D.T. (eds) Harming Future Persons. International Library of Ethics, Law, and the New Medicine, vol 35. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4020-5697-0_13
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4020-5697-0_13
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