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SELECTION AND EXPLANATION

  • ALEXANDER BIRD
Part of the BOSTON STUDIES IN THE PHILOSOPHY OF SCIENCE book series (BSPS, volume 252)

Abstract

Explanations appealing to natural selection have an unusual and prima facie paradoxical feature. While we may explain general truths using such explanations, those explanations do not transfer to the particular instances of those general truths. Thus natural selection and the selective advantage of speed in escaping predators can explain why healthy, normal, adult gazelles can run fast.

Keywords

General Truth Stick Insect General Proposition Selection Explanation White Object 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.

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References

  1. Achinstein, P. (1983). The Nature of Explanation. Oxford: Oxford University Press.Google Scholar
  2. Armstrong, D. (1983). What is a Law of Nature? Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.Google Scholar
  3. Dretske, F. (1977). Laws of Nature. Philosophy of Science 44: 248–268.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  4. Hempel, C. (1965). Aspects of Scientific Explanation. New York: The Free Press.Google Scholar

Copyright information

© Springer 2007

Authors and Affiliations

  • ALEXANDER BIRD

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